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PROPOSITION 16 AND THE NCAA INITIAL-
ELIGIBILITY STANDARDS: PUTING THE
STUDENT BACK IN STUDENT-ATHLETE
Lee J. Rosen'
Only one in every 10,000 young athletes will end up playing profes-
sional football or basketball.1 This means that out of the youths currently
involved in every level of basketball and football athletic programs, less
than 18,000 will play on a Division I level, and less than 200 will advance
to compete professionally.2 Nevertheless, big-time college athletic pro-
grams, primarily basketball and football, are a "training ground" where
the student-athlete is heavily recruited to play sports and earn massive
revenue for his school.'
Missing from the description of student-athletes is any mention of
studying, higher learning, or graduation, thus teaching the student-
athlete that he is only on campus to further enhance his athletic skill.
4
Far too often student-athletes receive compensation against National
Collegiate Athletic Association's (NCAA) rules, including gift promises,
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2001, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. See Raymie E. McKerrow & Norinne Hilchey Daly, Sports and Academic Studies
Are Compatible, in SPORTS IN AMERICA: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 65 (William Dudley ed.,
1994).
2. See id. Even the cream of the high school crop is not always successful. See Ste-
phen A. Smith, The Young and the Restless, THE HOuS. CHRON., May 5, 1996, at 1. Be-
tween 1977 and 1991 there were 354 McDonald's All-Americans--considered a high
school player's crowning achievement-but only 116 (less than one-third) had National
Basketball Association (NBA) careers lasting three or more seasons. See id.
3. NAND HART-NIBBRIG & CLEMENT COT'INGHAM, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF COLLEGE SPORTS 3 (1986) (discussing the corporate organization of college sports);
see also MURRAY SPERBER, COLLEGE SPORTS INC.: THE ATHLETIC DEPARTMENT VS.
THE UNIVERSITY 1-2 (1990) (clarifying the idea that colleges recruit elite student-athletes
based on their potential as commercial entertainers); TED WEISSBERG, BREAKING THE
RULES: THE NCAA AND RECRUITMENT IN AMERICA'S HIGH SCHOOLS 22 (1995).
4. See SPERBER, supra note 3, at 1-2. On today's college campus, colleges increas-
ingly separate student-athletes from their general student population. See HART-NIBBRIG
& COTTINGHAM, supra note 3, at 3 ("[I]ndeed, the adoption of the 'student-athlete' des-
ignation disguises this separation."). Recent studies generally support the idea that stu-
dent-athletes perform as well academically as non-athletes. See id. In many cases, how-
ever, student-athletes "are not in college to attain passing grades, though many eventually
do graduate." Id.
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cars, cash payments, and "no-show jobs."' Given the staggeringly small
percentage of athletes who make the professional ranks, far too many
student-athletes leave college unprepared to pursue careers outside of
the athletic world.6 This information reinforces the argument that ama-
teurism in college athletics no longer exists and that the corporate men-
tality threatens the future of college athletics 7
Like the student-athlete,8 college coaches face tremendous pressure to
win, especially because of the big business mentality that consumes col-
lege sports.' This win-at-all-costs attitude places coaches and athletes in
a difficult situation." Coaches must win, but doing so may compromise
5. HART-NIBBRIG & COTTINGHAM, supra note 3, at 3. The athletic booster or
alumni clubs that generate revenue for athletic programs persistently violate NCAA re-
cruitment policies. See id. at 89. Underground violations, such as providing coaches and
athletes with cars, women, money, summer jobs, and credit cards, are very difficult to pre-
vent. See id. at 13, 89-90. At Clemson University, "[tlhe mentality ... is that ethics aren't
as important as winning. The football team went 21-1 over the past two years and cheated
like crazy; the basketball team has been 20-34 and is completely clean. Yet the boosters
brag about the football program." Id. at 90.
6. See id. at 88, 89. Although student-athletes may graduate with a degree, they do
not necessarily receive a quality education. See SPERBER, supra note 3, at 301. The presi-
dent of an Illinois graphic-arts company "wanted to help some recently graduated wres-
tlers" by offering them jobs. Id. He realized, however, that the athletes "had unrealistic
expectations about jobs they might hold ... one guy wanted to be sales manager of my
company. He had no experience or skills whatsoever. What he really wanted wasn't a job.
He just wanted to be on the payroll . I..." d
7. See, e.g., HART-NIBBRIG & COTTINGHAM, supra note 3, at 3 ("Many private
colleges and universities ... are relatively strong bastions of amateurism. Yet even they
are infected with the virus of corporate athleticism.").
8. The average student body population at all Division I schools between 1983 and
1989 was 529,242 students and the average student-athlete population at all such schools
was 13,550 students-a mere 2.56% of the student population. Cf Cureton v. NCAA, 37
F. Supp. 2d 687, 708 (E.D. Pa. 1999), rev'd, 198 F. 3d 107 (3rd Cir. 1999), on remand to
2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 4790 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2000), reconsideration denied by 2000 U.S.
LEXIS 6526 (E.D. May 12, Pa. 2000).
9. See HART-NIBBRIG & COTrINGHAM, supra note 3, at 2-3; see also generally
ALLEN L. SACK & ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, COLLEGE ATHLETES FOR HIRE: THE
EVOLUTION AND LEGACY OF THE NCAA's AMATEUR MYTH 95 (1998) (asserting that
the commercialization of college athletics causes education to fall further into the back-
ground). Despite the prevailing myth that colleges and universities factor college sports
into their educational plans, the reality is that the primary purpose of college athletics is
"commercial entertainment." SPERBER, supra note 3, at 1. In many "big-time" programs,
the athletic department operates as a separate entity from the college and its educational
departments. Id.
10. See SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 9, at 95. Some commentators trace the
development of this business system and must-win philosophy back to the turn of the
twentieth century. See HART-NIBBRIG & COTrINGHAM, supra note 3, at 17.
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their institution's academic standards." The athlete, on the other hand,
may possess unparalleled athletic talent and may receive an athletic
scholarship regardless of educational ability or the desire to excel. 2 In an
effort to balance these factors, the NCAA enacted minimum eligibility
standards through its bylaws, the most recent being Proposition 16.13
During the Civil Rights Movement fierce opposition to these eligibility
standards grew, mainly because they allegedly had an unfair impact on
African-Americans, other minorities, and certain socio-economic
groups. Since the inception of minimum academic requirements for in-
11. See SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 9, at 95, 100-01. A case study analyzing
the University of Tulsa determined that for many athletes, college sports transformed
from recreation into jobs. See id. at 101. One student lamented that coaches who focused
on money and winning passed those pressures onto the student-athletes. See id. The
study also revealed that many athletes entered school with optimistic feelings about their
academic prospects. See id at 100-01. That vision was shattered at the end of their first
year when they realized the inherent difficulty of balancing sports and studying. See id. at
100-01. The study discovered that these students succumb to "role engulfment," a phe-
nomenon where the athlete role "dominate[s] all facets of their existence." Id. at 101.
12. See id. at 95. Many athletes feel a tremendous amount of pressure to be an ath-
lete first and then a student. See id. at 100. A 1983-1985 study sponsored by the Center
for Athletes' Rights and Education (CARE) looked at the relationship between athletics
and education. See id. The study specifically chose 644 male and female basketball play-
ers who represented colleges and universities in 35 conferences in all three NCAA divi-
sions. See id. Forty-one percent of Division I athletes, 23% of Division II athletes, and
12% of Division III athletes answered affirmatively when asked whether they felt pressure
to be an athlete first and a student second. See id. Another question asked whether
coaches' demands hindered their ability to be top students. See id. Again, Division I ath-
letes responded "yes" more frequently than the other divisions, but men were more likely
than women to feel this pressure regardless of division. See id. A more disturbing finding
indicated that many Division I athletes felt compelled to take simpler majors, miss classes,
take easier semester course loads, miss exams, and take "other academic shortcuts." Id.
Although this particular study is criticized due to a "scientifically inadequate sampling de-
sign," it accurately conveys some of the major issues surrounding college athletes. Id. at
101.
13. See Laura Pentimone, The National Collegiate Athletic Association's Quest to
Educate the Student-Athlete: Are the Academic Eligibility Requirements an Attempt To
Foster Academic Integrity or Merely to Promote Racism?, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
471, 473 (1998) (discussing the development of academic eligibility requirements which
culminated in the implementation of Proposition 16).
14. See SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 9, at 96-97 (attributing criticism of the
NCAA's eligibility rule to its alleged intent to discriminate against minority athletes). Of
those African-American students who registered with the NCAA Clearinghouse at Divi-
sion I universities, 26.6% failed to meet Proposition 16's standards in 1996 and 21.4% did
not qualify in 1997. See Memorandum from NCAA Division I Academics/ Eligibility/
Compliance Cabinet Subcommittee on Initial-Eligibility Issues to Chief Executive Offi-
cers, Faculty Athletics Representatives, Directors of Athletics, Senior Woman Adminis-
trators, and Compliance Officers of NCAA Division I Institutions 756a (July 27, 1998)
[hereinafter Memorandum] (on file with Catholic University Law Review). However, only
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coming student-athletes, the NCAA has dealt with horror stories of col-
lege athletes who graduated without even knowing how to read.' 5 Yet,
one of the NCAA's main goals is to maintain a clear delineation between
intercollegiate athletics and professional sports while keeping athletics an
essential component of the educational experience.' 6 The NCAA be-
lieves that uniform rules are essential "to accomplish its goals of scholar-
ship, sportsmanship, and amateurism" because such goals place all col-
leges and universities on equal footing.' 7  Despite routine criticism
characterizing the NCAA as a "weak institution,' '' 8 it wields a great
power in the world of collegiate athletics-perhaps too much. 9
This Comment addresses the effects of Proposition 16 on college ath-
letics, beginning with the history of NCAA action, the previous rules
promulgated by the NCAA, and the current Proposition 16 court battle.
Next, this Comment analyzes the arguments surrounding Proposition 16
6.4% of white student athletes in 1996 and 4.2% in 1997 failed to meet the eligibility stan-
dards. See id.
A 1992 study conducted by the National Center for Education Statistics found that
67.4% of white college-bound students would have met Proposition 16's initial eligibility
requirements, while only 46.4% of black college-bound students would have satisfied
those standards. See Jason M. Stallman, This Prop Isn't Sweet 16 for Some College Re-
cruits: Rule Sparks Renewed Debate on Fairness, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 15,
1996, at ID. The NCAA conducted an Academic Performance Study (APS) showing that
Proposition 16 disqualifies 72% of prospective African-American student-athletes, com-
pared to 17% of potential white student-athletes. See Brief for Appellees/Cross-
Appellants at 28, Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 708 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (Nos. 99-
1222, 99-1298) [hereinafter Brief for Appellees]. The NCAA standards have also signifi-
cantly affected low-income families. See Memorandum, supra, at 756a. Specifically, the
NCAA determined that 18% of all student-athletes with a family income below $30,000
failed to satisfy Proposition 16's standards, "wheras only 2.5[%] of student-athletes with a
family income of greater than $80,000 failed to qualify." Id. The aforementioned Na-
tional Center for Education Statistics study also found that student-athletes from higher
socio-economic groups would have been eligible at a far higher rate (94%) than those stu-
dents from lower groups (63%). See Stallman, supra, at ID.
15. See, e.g., SPERBER, supra note 3, at 278 (describing how All-NFL player and for-
mer Oklahoma State star Dexter Manley admitted before a congressional hearing that de-
spite graduating from college, he was illiterate).
16. See Pentimone, supra note 13, at 478 & n.55, 479 & n.56 (citing to article 1.13 of
the NCAA Manual and to section 2.4 of the NCAA Constitution).
17. NCAA v. Miller, 795 F. Supp. 1476, 1484 (D. Nev. 1992) (stating that the
achievement of these goals relies upon a national and uniform enforcement of the
NCAA's rules).
18. E.g., HART-NIBBRIG & COTIINGHAM, supra note 3, at 14.
19. See, e.g., Brian L. Porto, Legal and Constitutional Challenges to the NCAA: The
Limits of Adjudication in Intercollegiate Athletics, in GOVERNMENT AND SPORT: THE
PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES 117, 121 (Arthur T. Johnson & James H. Frey eds., 1985) ("[T]he
federal courts have indicated their belief that the scope of NCAA authority has expanded
greatly since the organization's early days as a purely legislative agency.").
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in light of the NCAA's role in promulgating standards. This Comment
analyzes the loss of amateurism in college athletics and examines oppor-
tunities for reform. Finally, this Comment poses alternatives to the use
of any eligibility requirements while suggesting potential solutions to the
NCAA's current state of affairs.
I. PROPOSITION 16: THE NCAA'S ATTEMPT To SALVAGE A
REPUTATION AMIDST GROWING EMBARRASSMENTS
Following numerous eligibility scandals and debacles, the NCAA en-
acted minimum academic standards for incoming college athletes.2°
Regulation began with "home rule," which evolved into the "1.600
Rule," until the NCAA enacted Proposition 48, which Proposition 16
21later replaced. Proposition 48 and Proposition 16, nearly identical in
scope, use different initial eligibility standards. 2 Proposition 16, the cur-
rent standard, is a necessary evil for any athlete considering participation
in intercollegiate sports.
A. The Beginnings of NCAA Mandated Regulation: Answering
Previously Unanswered Questions
Enacted by the NCAA in 1996, Proposition 16 is a relatively recent
addition to the NCAA's bylaws." Prior to 1965, schools freely enacted
their own admission policies for college athletes and set their own eligi-
bility standards under the "home rule" policy.24 This "home rule" policy
fell out of favor and in 1965 the NCAA adopted the "1.600 rule, 25 which
"required that NCAA-affiliated schools grant athletic scholarships, first
year eligibility for participation in athletics, and other benefits only to
applicants who could 'predict' . . . a minimum 1.600 grade point average
20. See discussion infra Part I.
21. See infra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 33-51 and accompanying text.
23. See Kenneth L. Shropshire, Colorblind Propositions: Race, the SAT, & the
NCAA, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 141, 144 (1997) [hereinafter Shropshire, Colorblind
Propositions]. The NCAA formed in the early part of the twentieth century in response to
the severe violence associated with college football. See PAUL R. LAWRENCE,
UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION
AND THE BUSINESS OF COLLEGE FOOTBALL 10-13 (1987). The NCAA's original name is
the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States (IAAUS), which was for-
mally changed in 1910 to the NCAA. See id. at 13.
24. KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE, IN BLACK AND WHITE: RACE AND SPORTS IN
AMERICA 107 (1996) [hereinafter SHROPSHIRE, IN BLACK AND WHITE].
25. Id.; see also SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 9, at 96 (indicating that this rule
became applicable in 1966).
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during their first year in college."26 This prediction of a high school stu-
dent's future college grade point average (GPA) was based on the stu-
dent's past high school GPA or class rank, and his score on either the
Scholastic Aptitude (later "Assessment") Test (SAT) or the American
College Test (ACT).27 In 1973, the NCAA repealed the "1.600 rule" and
replaced it with the "2.000 rule."6 The new rule only required student-
athletes to attain an overall 2.0 high school GPA to be eligible for ath-
letic competition.29
NCAA eligibility determinations that were based solely on high school
GPAs generated some concern. 3  For example, "[w]as an A in rural
Oklahoma the same as an A in a New York public high school [or] [h]ad
the star athlete in Tucson been given a passing grade by a basketball-fan
faculty member?, 31 Consequently, the NCAA eventually used the SAT
and the ACT as a uniform method to measure students' academic capa-
bilities.32
In 1986 the NCAA enacted Proposition 48, which set new minimum
academic requirements for incoming student-athletes. 33 By the 1988-1989
26. Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1030 (5th Cir. 1975) (stating that the NCAA im-
plemented the 1.600 rule to maintain the athlete as "an integral part of the student body"
while simultaneously preserving the meaningful role of intercollegiate sports in collegiate
educational programs). The NCAA also adopted this rule to help maintain its academic
integrity. See Pentimone, supra note 13, at 479 & n.61.
27. See Parish, 506 F.2d at 1030.
28. Id. at 1030 n.1; see also FRANCIS X. DEALY JR., WIN AT ANY COST: THE SELL
OUT OF COLLEGE ATHLETICS 112-13 (1990).
29. See Parish, 506 F.2d at 1030 n.1; see also DEALY , supra note 28, at 113 (explain-
ing that between 1971 and 1986 a high-school senior with a 2.0 GPA in general wood-
working classes could receive an athletic scholarship). Coaches could not find fault with
the 2.0 rule. See id. at 113-14. A coach could brag about recruiting almost any athlete
without violating any rule, providing the student had a 2.0 GPA. See id. Once enrolled at
the university, these students devoted nearly all of their time to athletic endeavors, in-
cluding practicing and competing "at least four and half hours a day, seven days a week."
Id. at 114.
30. See SHROPSHIRE, IN BLACK AND WHITE, supra note 24, at 107.
31. Id.
32. See id.
33. See Pentimone, supra note 13, at 481. Known officially as NCAA Bylaw 14.3, the
initial standards required a student-athlete to attain a minimum GPA in 11 core classes
(including math, English, natural sciences, and social sciences) and a minimum SAT score
of 700 or a minimum ACT score of 15. See SHROPSHIRE, IN BLACK AND WHITE, supra
note 24, at 108; see also Christopher W. Lewis, Athletic Eligibility: Too High a Hurdle for
the Learning Disabled, 15 COOLEY L. REv. 75, 77 (1998) (explaining that the NCAA must
approve the list of the "core courses"). The list of acceptable classes specifically excludes
special education and remedial courses. See id. This clearly leaves learning-disabled stu-
dents disadvantaged because they may be required to participate in special classes not
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academic year, the NCAA completely phased in Proposition 48's re-
quirements3 4 and required a high school student-athlete to obtain a
minimum of 700 on his SAT, (or 17 out of a possible 36 on the ACT) and
to maintain a "C" average or a 2.0 GPA in eleven core-curriculum
classes. 35 The NCAA considered student-athletes who met these stan-
dards eligible, upon enrollment in college, to compete, practice, and re-
ceive "athletically related financial aid., 36 Otherwise, the NCAA pro-
hibited them "from such opportunities during their first year., 37  The
final impetus behind the decision to implement Proposition 48 stems
from a rash of stand-out student-athletes, including basketball players
John "Hot Rod" Williams and Chris Washburn, who gained admission
into educational institutions despite exceedingly low SAT scores. The
media criticized Proposition 48 and placed the NCAA under fire for
"'recruit[ing] educationally ill-prepared, but physically talented, minority
athletes, us[ing] them until they exhausted their athletic eligibility, then
discard[ing] them . . . still without the ability to read at a fifth-grade
among the eleven NCAA "core courses," which may prevent them from satisfying the
NCAA's requirements. Id. at 77-78.
34. See Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 690 (E.D. Pa. 1999), rev'd, 198 F. 3d
107 (3rd Cir. 1999), on remand to 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 4790 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2000), re-
consideration denied by 2000 U.S. LEXIS 6526 (E.D. Pa. May 12, 2000).
35. See Pentimone, supra note 13, at 481-82. A student receives 400 points on the
SAT for merely signing his name and answering one question. See SPERBER, supra note 3,
at 218 (putting the NCAA's minimum requirement into perspective). A student then only
needs 300 more points to become eligible under Proposition 48. See SACK AND
STAUROWSKY, supra note 9, at 98 (citing U.S. College Board statistics that indicate that
80-85% of the individuals who sat for the SAT in 1982 would have met the Proposition 48
requirement). To meet this requirement, an individual only needs to answer correctly 13
out of 60 math questions and 24 out of 85 verbal questions-a 25% average. See
SPERBER, supra note 3, at 218 ("Similar statistics apply to the ACT exam."). To pass most
college exams and high school tests, "a student must answer at least 50[%] of the questions
correctly." Id.
36. Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 690.
37. Id.
38. See SPERBER, supra note 3, at 218-20. Tulane University admitted Williams with
an SAT score of 470, while the median score for incoming freshman was 1121. See id. at
218-19. North Carolina State University admitted Washburn with an SAT score of 470,
while the median score for incoming freshman was 1030. See id. at 219. The Washburn
scenario is far from unique. In the mid-1980s 40% of the athletes at North Carolina State
had SAT scores below 700. See id. at 220. Members of the state faculty investigated North
Carolina State's admission practices and found that coach Jim Valvano and his assistant
coaches enjoyed carte blanche authority to admit whoever they wanted. See PETER
GOLENBOCK, PERSONAL FOULS 42 (1989). The investigation revealed that its coaches
acted as admissions officers by "virtually admitting some athletes even before they took
their SATs," and publicly announcing that a player had signed a letter of intent to attend
the college on scholarship. Id.
Catholic University Law Review
level. ," 9
Proposition 48 also developed the concept of "partial qualifiers,"
which allowed high school student-athletes to receive athletic scholar-
ships if they partially met the academic requirements. 40 This system for-
bade the student-athlete from competing as a freshman, but allowed him
to compete during his second year if he maintained "good academic
standing" and "an overall grade point average of 2.0 in twenty-four units
of college work."4'
In 1992, the NCAA modified the initial eligibility rules and adopted
Proposition 16, which took effect in 1996.2 Proposition 16 used an "ini-
tial-eligibility index" that shifted some of the focus away from the SAT
and ACT amidst concerns of their inherent racial biases.43 The "initial-
39. Pentimone, supra note 13, at 480 (quoting Symposium, College Athletics as a Ve-
hicle For Social Reform, 22 J.C. & U.L. 77, 83 (1995)). Former Washington Redskin Dex-
ter Manley fits within this category of ill-prepared students as he graduated from Okla-
homa State University unable to read. See id. at 480 n.66 (citing Tom Callahan, Pro
Football's Everyman, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec 17, 1990, at 78).
40. SPERBER, supra note 3, at 221; see also Pentimone, supra note 13, at 483. Propo-
sition 48 defines "partial qualifier," as a student who achieved the required GPA, but not
the necessary SAT score, or vice versa. Id. A successful partial qualifier proved that he
deserved to be admitted to the university because of his ability to handle the rigors associ-
ated with collegiate academics despite low test scores or GPA. See SHROPSHIRE, IN
BLACK AND WHITE, supra note 24, at 118. A partial qualifier could receive both athletic
and nonathletic financial aid and was allowed to practice, but not play, with the team dur-
ing his freshman year. See id. "Nonqualifiers," eligible only for nonathletic financial aid,
received such aid based on need and school guidelines. Id.
41. Pentimone, supra note 13, at 483-84. If, however, the student-athlete could not
achieve the requisite GPA, that student-athlete became a "nonqualifier" by NCAA stan-
dards and lost his eligibility to play or to receive a scholarship. Id. A 1.987 survey of Divi-
sion I schools identified 599 partial qualifiers and 85 nonqualifiers on college campuses.
See SPERBER, supra note 3, at 222. The Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC) amended their
original policy, which prohibited conference members from accepting any partial qualifiers
and currently maintains a "selective intitial eligibility policy." Larry Keec, ACC Adopts
New Standards for Some Athletes, NEWS & REC., July 1, 1995, at C3. The ACC now per-
mits each school a quota of four partial qualifiers, but it is limited to two men and two
women and only one athlete per sport. See id.
42. See Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 690 (E.D. Pa. 1999), rev'd, 198 F. 3d
107 (3rd Cir. 1999), on remand to 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 4790 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2000), re-
consideration denied by 2000 U.S. LEXIS 6526 (E.D. Pa. May 12, 2000); Shropshire, Col-
orblind Propositions, supra note 23, at 144; see also Pentimone, supra note 13, at 486.
Proposition 16 is codified as NCAA Bylaw 14.3. See NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION, 1996-97 NCAA MANUAL 166 (Laurie Bollig ed. 1996) [hereinafter NCAA
MANUAL].
43. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 42, art. 14.3.1.1.1; see Pentimone, supra note 13, at
487. It is argued that the SAT's inherent bias centers on "differential item functioning"
(DIF). DEALY, supra note 28, at 116. The support for this argument states that "stan-
dardized tests [such as the SAT] are culturally biased against poor students, both black
[Vol. 50:175
2000] Proposition 16 and the NCAA Initial-Eligibility Standards 183
eligibility index" allowed student-athletes to establish eligibility with a
2.0 GPA in thirteen core courses, provided they also obtained SAT
scores of 1010 (or combined ACT score of 86)." The other end of the
scale allowed a student-athlete to receive an SAT score of 820 (or 68
ACT), provided he maintained a GPA of at least 2.5.4' The new stan-
dards also changed the meaning of "partial qualifier" to include student-
athletes whose total SAT scores fell between 720 and 810 with corre-
sponding GPAs.46
B. Enter the Lawsuits: The NCAA's Role as a State Actor
Individuals may sue the NCAA under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
and white, because a number of their verbal questions relate most directly to upper-
middle-class white life." John R. Allison, Rule-Making Accuracy in the NCAA and its
Member Institutions: Do Their Decisional Structures and Processes Promote Educational
Primacy for the Student-Athlete?, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 54 (1995). According to the DIF
theory, unique cultural backgrounds cause different groups of people to define the same
or similar words differently, and dissimilar economic or social backgrounds may cause un-
familiarity with certain words or phrases. See Pentimone, supra note 13, at 474. As a re-
sult, DIF experts say that the SAT more accurately measures "developed ability" instead
of intelligence. Id. An example of this cultural bias includes the following SAT question:
"Runner is to marathon as: (a) envoy: embassy (b) martyr: massacre (c) oarsman: regatta
(d) referee: tournament (e) horse: stable. The correct answer is (c)[;]" but only 22% of
African-American test takers answer this question correctly, whereas 52% of white test
takers choose the correct answer. DEALY, supra note 28, at 116-17. Chuck Stone, the col-
umnist who provided this illustration, explained that "[s]uburban kids are just more fa-
miliar with regattas then ghetto kids." Id.
44. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 42, arts. 14.3.1.1(b), 14.3.1.1.1, 14.3.1.2. To meet the
core-course requirement:
A "core course" is defined as a recognized academic course (as opposed to a vo-
cational or personal-services course) that offers fundamental instructional com-
ponents in a specific area of study. Courses that are taught at a level below the
high school's regular academic instructional level (e.g., remedial, special educa-
tion, or compensatory) shall not be considered core courses regardless of course
content.
Id. art. 14.3.1.3. The new core curriculum required classes in the following academic areas:
four years of English, two years of mathematics, including one year of algebra and geome-
try ("or one year of a higher-level mathematics course for which geometry is a prerequi-
site"); two years of natural or physical science (including at least one laboratory course if
offered by the high school); one year of additional courses in any of the aforementioned
subjects; two years of social science; and two years of additional credit in any of the above
courses or foreign language, computer science, philosophy or nondoctrinal religion. Id.
45. See id. art. 14.3.1.1(b).
46. Id. art. 14.3.2.1.1. For example, an individual with an SAT score of 780 and a
core-curriculum GPA of 2.6 at the time of graduation from high school could be a "poten-
tial qualifier." Id. A "partial qualifier," unlike a "qualifier," cannot compete in intercol-
legiate sports during his first academic year; however, he may practice on campus and re-
ceive financial aid. Id. arts. 14.3.2.1.1-14.3.2.1.1.1; see also Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 691
(discussing "partial qualifiers" under Proposition 16).
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of 1964 (Title VI).4 ' Title VI provides that "[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial as-
sistance."48 In order to sustain a disparate impact49 case under Title VI, a
plaintiff must prove that the NCAA is a state actor, and that the state ac-
tion violated the plaintiff's due process constitutional rights. 5 Due proc-
ess claims against the NCAA have been brought under the Fourteenth
Amendment because courts have found that the NCAA's action consti-
tutes "state action."'" Because nonqualifiers have sued the NCAA under
Title VI, the NCAA's prior role as a state actor becomes important in
understanding the manner in which courts attack Proposition 16.52
47. See generally, e.g., Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Pa. 1999), rev'd,
198 F. 3d 107 (3rd Cir. 1999), on remand to 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 4790 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13,
2000), reconsideration denied by 2000 U.S. LEXIS 6526 (E.D. Pa. May 12, 2000).
48. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994); see also 110 CONG. REC.
7062 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1964) (statement of Sen. Pastore). In discussing Title VI, Senator
Pastore stated:
Title VI enables the Congress to consider the overall issue of racial discrimina-
tion separately from the issue of desirability of any particular Federal assistance
program.
... IT]he purpose of [T]itle VI is to make sure that funds of the United States are
not used to support racial discrimination. In many instances, the practices of seg-
regation and discrimination, which [T]itle VI seeks to end, are unconstitutional.
Id.
49. See infra note 101 (explaining the elements of a disparate impact case).
50. See Pentimone, supra note 13, at 501. The statute reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
51. Porto, supra note 19, at 121 ("[T]he NCAA performs legislative, administrative,
and adjudicative functions that are governmental in nature and that would have to be per-
formed by a government agency if the NCAA did not exist.). "The NCAA is a voluntary,
unincorporated association of approximately 1,200 members, [including] colleges and uni-
versities, conferences and associations, and other educational institutions." Cureton, 37 F.
Supp. 2d at 690. The active members are divided into several divisions, but only Divisions
I and II are subject to Proposition 16 standards. See id.; NCAA MANUAL, supra note 42,
art. 14.3 (setting out the academic requirements for Division I and II schools); see also The
Official NCAA Website (visited June 16, 2000) <http://www.ncaa.org/about/membership.
html> discussing NCAA membership).
52. See, e.g., Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d. at 692-96.
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1. Attacking the Arbitrary Beginnings of Eligibility Requirements
Five Centenary College basketball players brought one of the earliest
constitutional challenges to the NCAA's "1.600 rule."53  The NCAA
sanctioned Centenary for violating the "1.600 rule;" however, the college
insisted that it complied with the NCAA's rules when it recruited the
athletes, despite substantial evidence indicating the department's knowl-
edge of the players' inability to satisfy the "1.600 rule. 54 Centenary re-
fused to declare the students ineligible and allowed them to continue
playing.5 As the likelihood of Centenary receiving an invitation to an
NCAA postseason tournament increased, the five players brought a law-
suit against the NCAA that claimed that the NCAA denied them due
56process and equal protection of the laws.
The Parish court first determined that the NCAA acted "under color
of state law," which subjected the NCAA to federal jurisdiction under 42
U.S.C. § 1983."7 Although the court failed to identify clearly the NCAA
as a state actor, it determined that the NCAA met § 1983's jurisdictional
requirements. 8 The five student-athletes conceded that the NCAA vio-
lated no fundamental right, but claimed that the "1.600 rule" discrimi-
nated against a "vaguely defined class" or classes that they could only
obscurely identify.59 Because the court declined to extend strict scrutiny
to "a large, diverse, and amorphous class" whose members' only similar-
53. Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1030, 1031 (5th Cir. 1975) (challenging the consti-
tutionality of the rule on due process and equal protection grounds); see also supra notes
26-30 and accompanying text (discussing the rule and its requirements).
54. Parish, 506 F.2d at 1030-31. The sanctions prevented Centenary from playing in
any NCAA sponsored tournaments or in any NCAA sanctioned televised game unless it
declared the five students ineligible. See id. The college and the players requested a tem-
porary restraining order, however, which the court granted to allow the athletes to con-
tinue playing. See id. at 1031.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 1031, 1033. High school associations have also been held to act under color
of state law. See, e.g., Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. St. Augustine High School,
396 F.2d 224, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1968) (showing that the conduct of the Lousiana High
School Athletic Association constituted state action and holding that the association vio-
lated the Constitution through racial discrimination).
58. Parish, 506 F.2d at 1033 (concluding that given the NCAA's national scope and
the government's concern with education, the government would step in and fill the void if
the NCAA suddenly disappeared).
59. Id. The students suggested "seven potential suspect classes: (1) blacks; (2) cul-
tural minorities; (3) the educationally deprived; (4) persons of less than average intelli-
gence; (5) late achieving students; (6) student athletes; and (7) impecunious student ath-
letes." Id.
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ity included the failure to qualify under the NCAA's "1.600 rule," the
court applied a "minimum rationality" standard of review. 6° The court
found no "property" or "liberty" interest and held that the due process
61clause afforded no protection to the athletes.
The constitutionality of the "1.600 rule" again faced a challenge in
McDonald v. NCAA.12 The McDonald court decided that the individual
student-athlete possesses no constitutionally protected interest in his in-
stitution's membership and participation in NCAA activities. 63 Thus, the
court held that because the NCAA does not have the power to suspend
or discipline an athlete who violates the NCAA's rules and regulations,
the NCAA is not a state actor.64
2. The Weakling Versus the Bully: The Student-Athlete Tries to Fight
Back
In Wiley v. NCAA,65 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found
that student-athletes who are displeased with their high school athletic
associations or the NCAA, absent clearly defined constitutional princi-
ples, do not present substantial federal questions.66 In this case, Wiley, an
athlete at the University of Kentucky, brought suit after the NCAA de-
clared him ineligible because the total amount of his athletic scholarship
award and a federal Basic Education Opportunity Grant (BEOG) ex-
ceeded the NCAA's financial aid limitations.67 The court held that the
case did not involve the right to a college education or to participate in
intercollegiate athletics.6 Instead, the court looked at whether there was
a constitutional right to attend college, play sports, and receive a favor-
60. Id. at 1034 (quoting San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28
(1973)). The court also rejected the appellants' due process claims because their lost op-
portunity to participate in tournaments and televised games resulted from the school's re-
fusal to comply with the NCAA's rules. See id. at 1034 & n.16.
61. Id.
62. 370 F. Supp. 625, 626 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (reviewing the "1.600 rule" for a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause).
63. Id. at 631.
64. See id. at 632. The court stated that a college's intercollegiate athletic program
does not depend on the NCAA and that the individual schools may freely adopt rules and
regulations they desire in order to run their athletic programs. See id. at 631. Because the
NCAA is not a state actor, McDonald had no standing to assert a protectable interest un-
der the U.S. Constitution. See id. at 632.
65. 612 F.2d 473 (10th Cir. 1979).
66. See id at 477.
67. See id. at 474.
68. See id. at 476.
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able financial arrangement. 6' The court decided that no such right ex-
ists. 70 The court's decision produced a two-fold effect: first, the court de-
termined that the NCAA is not a state actor, and second, that student-
athletes are not constitutionally guaranteed the right to attend college or
participate in intercollegiate athletics.7'
Further, the court in Ross v. Creighton University72 closed other ave-
nues of recourse available to the student-athlete.7' Ross accepted a
scholarship to play basketball at Creighton University (Creighton) de-
spite scoring in the bottom fifth percentile of individuals taking the
ACT.74 The school promised sufficient tutoring for Ross to remedy his
academic shortcomings and to ensure that he would "receive a meaning-
ful education while at Creighton. ''75 Although Ross attended Creighton
from 1978 until 1982, he maintained a D average and had "the reading
skills of a seventh grader" when he left.76  Ross consequently sued
Creighton on three separate theories of negligence, all of which the court
denied Ross also alleged that Creighton breached an oral and a written
contract which stated that Ross promised to play on Creighton's basket-
ball team in exchange for the opportunity to participate meaningfully in
the school's academic program.7 8 The court held that the lower court
69. See id.
70. See id. at 477.
71. See id. at 476-77. Judge Logan's dissent stated that "[t]here is state action in the
application of NCAA rules; their enforcement by state university members is so inter-
twined with the state-controlled educational process that judicial evaluation of the conduct
is warranted." Id. at 479 (Logan, J., dissenting).
72. 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992).
73. See generally id.
74. See id. at 411 ("[T]he average freshman admitted to Creighton with [Ross] scored
in the upper twenty-seven percent.").
75. Id.
76. Id. at 412. Ross completed 96 of the 128 credits necessary to graduate, but took
classes including Marksmanship and Theory of Basketball which did not count toward his
university degree. See id.; see also Bill Brubaker, Minimum Standard, Maximum Dispute,
WASH. POST, July 25, 1999, at D1 (reporting that Ross revealed in print and on television
that he had not mastered reading "until he joined a class of third graders" after leaving
Creighton).
77. See Ross, 957 F.2d at 412. Ross claimed that Creighton "committed 'educational
malpractice' by not providing him with a meaningful education and preparing him for em-
ployment following college" and "negligently inflicted emotional distress upon him by en-
rolling him in a stressful university environment for which he was not prepared," and sub-
sequently failed to help him survive. Id. Ross also urged the court to adopt a new cause
of action for the tort of "negligent admission," which would allow a "woefully unprepared
student" to recover damages from the admitting institution. Id.
78. See id. at 412, 415-16 (explaining Ross's contract claim as alleging that Creighton
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erred in dismissing the validity of the contract claim.79 However, the
court emphasized that the judiciary generally should not play a major
role in supervising the relationships between student-athletes and col-
leges.80 Ultimately, the court only remanded Ross's "specific and narrow
claim that he was barred from any participation in and benefit from the
University's academic program," which appeared to leave the door
slightly open for similar claims in the future.8'
3. Finding the NCAA To Be a State Actor?
Perhaps the most infamous and controversial case concerning the
NCAA's role as a state actor was NCAA v. Tarkanian.82 The Tarkanian
court held by a 5-4 margin that the NCAA was not a "state actor" under
the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause.83 The case involved
the NCAA placing the University of Nevada at Las Vegas (UNLV) on
probation after uncovering that UNLV and its head coach, Jerry Tar-
kanian, violated numerous NCAA rules.84 The NCAA ordered that
UNLV show cause as to why the NCAA should not impose additional
penalties on the university.' Facing a potential demotion and a drastic
pay cut, Tarkanian brought suit alleging that the NCAA deprived him of
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 86
The Court distinguished state action that warrants scrutiny under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause from private conduct that
87receives no such protection. In deciding that the NCAA did not fall
denied Ross the opportunity to benefit from any academic program or tutoring service,
disallowed him to "red-shirt," and failed to financially support his college education).
79. See id. at 417. This type of contractual claim may nevertheless provide the stu-
dent-athlete with the best chance of success against the NCAA. See Porto, supra note 19,
at 130. Some argue that the nature of athletic scholarships may confer upon the athlete
contractual "entitlements" to participate in college sports and to enjoy economic benefits
in the scholarship agreement and freedom from arbitrarily losing these entitlements. Id.
80. See Ross, 957 F.2d at 417 (pointing out that courts likewise should not create new
relationships between schools and student-athletes).
81. Id. Today, Ross is a school custodian and is working toward a college degree in
hopes of becoming a guidance counselor. See Brubaker, supra note 76, at D1.
82. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
83. Id. at 180, 199.
84. See id. at 181. NCAA investigators discovered 38 NCAA violations by UNLV
personnel, 10 of which Tarkanian committed. See id. The most serious finding indicated
that Tarkanian "had violated the University's obligation to provide full cooperation with
the NCAA investigation." Id. at 186.
85. See id. at 181 (stating that the NCAA would impose a penalty unless the univer-
sity broke ties with Tarkanian).
86. See id.
87. See id. at 191 & n.il.
[Vol. 50:175
2000] Proposition 16 and the NCAA Initial-Eligibility Standards 189
within the meaning of a "state actor" under the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution, the Court acknowledged the close relationship be-
tween the NCAA and its member institutions."8 The Court concluded
that the conduct causing the deprivation of a federal right could not be
attributed to the state; therefore, no state action occurred.89
More recently, a student in NCAA v. Smith0 attempted to sustain a
private action against the NCAA, claiming that the NCAA's receipt of
dues brought the association within the scope of Title IX of the Educa-
tion Amendment of 1972.9' Title VI and Title IX employ the same lan-
guage to describe the benefited class "[e]xcept for the substitution of the
word 'sex' in Title IX to replace the words 'race, color, or national origin
in Title VI." 92 The Supreme Court held that dues collected by entities
that indirectly benefit from federal assistance, such as the NCAA, are in-
sufficient to provide the entities with Title IX coverage.93 Therefore, the
Court concluded that a more significant nexus must be established in or-
der to consider the NCAA a state actor. 4 This ruling suggests that any-
one attempting to sue the NCAA must carry out the almost impossible
task of showing that the NCAA is a state actor in order to subject it to
suit under either Title VI (like Cureton) or Title IX (like Smith).9
88. Id. at 191, 194-95. The Court determined that the NCAA's actions could consti-
tute state action if UNLV utilized the NCAA's rules as state rules. See id. at 194.
89. See id. at 199.
90. 525 U.S. 459 (1999).
91. See id. at 462.
92. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-95, 703 (1979) ("We have no
doubt that Congress intended to create Title IX remedies comparable to those available
under Title VI and that it understood Title VI [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] as author-
izing an implied private cause of action for victims of the prohibited discrimination.").
93. See Smith, 525 U.S. at 468. "Title IX, like its model Title VI, sought to accom-
plish two related, but nevertheless somewhat different, objectives. First, Congress wanted
to avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices; second, it wanted
to provide individual citizens effective protection against those practices." Cannon, 441
U.S. at 704.
94. See Smith, 525 U.S. at 468.
95. See Id. at 470; Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 694 (E.D. Pa. 1999), rev'd,
198 F. 3d 107 (3rd Cir. 1999), on remand to 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 4790 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13,
2000), reconsideration denied by 2000 U.S. LEXIS 6526 (E.D. Pa. May 12, 2000); Parish v.
NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1031 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1975) (describing the distinction between "un-
der color of state law" and "state action" as semantic). "Under color of state law" is re-
quired by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, while "state action" is reflective of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's requirement. Id.
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4. Enter Cureton: The Attack Against Proposition 16 Begins
In Cureton v. NCAA,' the fierce debate regarding initial eligibility
standards reemerged.9 7 Four African-American student-athletes failed to
achieve the NCAA's minimum standardized test requirements which
prevented them from participating in NCAA athletics during their first
year. The Cureton nonqualifiers claimed that the NCAA denied them
athletic scholarships (or provided less financial aid), recruiting opportu-
nities (or fewer opportunities), and/or admission to Division I schools.99
Cureton attacked the Proposition 16 standard and indirectly attacked the
NCAA."" The nonqualifiers claimed that the NCAA unlawfully denied
them educational opportunities and that minimum standardized test
score requirements had an "unjustified disparate impact on African-
American student-athletes."'0 '
96. 37 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Pa. 1999), rev'd, 198 F. 3d 107 (3rd Cir. 1999), on remand
to 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 4790 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2000), reconsideration denied by 2000
U.S. LEXIS 6526 (E.D. Pa. May 12, 2000). Part I.B.4 of this Comment discusses the Cu-
reton cases in detail. It is important to note that Cureton was recently dismissed due to a
technicality and the presiding judge's unwillingness to allow the claim to be amended. The
original plaintiffs in Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Pa. 1999), rev'd, 198 F. 3d
107 (3rd Cir. 1999), on remand to 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 4790 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2000), re-
consideration denied by 2000 U.S. LEXIS 6526 (E.D. Pa. May 12, 2000), unsuccessfully
attempted to use a "disparate impact" argument under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The original plaintiffs unsuccessfully attempted to amend the suit to add Title VI
"purposeful discrimination" claims. As a result, two new plaintiffs have filed a class action
suit that favors this "purposeful discrimination" argument. In addition, the plaintiffs have
also added claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, and Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in order to attack Proposition 16
and subject the NCAA to a federal claim. See Shannon P. Duffy, Taking Another Shot at
Changing the NCAA's Use of SAT Standards, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 27,
2000, at 3. Despite the court's dismissal of the Cureton case, the issues addressed in this
Comment are unaffected and remain current and valid in relation to Title VI.
97. See generally Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 687.




101. Id. To make a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination, the plaintiff(s)
must first show that "the application of a specific facially neutral selection practice has
caused an adverse disproportionate effect, to wit, excluding the plaintiff and similarly situ-
ated applicants from an educational opportunity." Id. at 697. Once the plaintiff proves his
prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant who must show that the dispro-
portionate effect is an educationally justified necessity. See id. Even if the defendant
meets this burden, a plaintiff may discredit the given justification or provide an "equally
effective alternative" that serves the educational need with "less racial disproportionality."
Id. The plaintiff, however, always carries the ultimate burden of proving that there was a
"discriminatory effect." Id.
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The district court required the Cureton nonqualifiers, in order to sus-
tain a private action under Title VI, to- establish that (1) the NCAA re-
ceives federal financial assistance, and (2) Proposition 16's minimum test
score requirement actually causes a disparate impact on African-
American student-athletes. 2
The first prong of the test required the Cureton nonqualifiers to show
that the NCAA is a state actor. 10 3 Following the NCAA's admission that
it collects dues from schools who receive federal funds, the Cureton non-
qualifiers concluded that the NCAA "indirectly receives" federal funds
and, therefore, is subject to Title VI.'9 The court followed the NCAA v.
Smith decision 5 and did not allow the Cureton nonqualifiers to rely
solely on the NCAA's indirect receipt of federal funds.1 6 Nevertheless,
the court held that the NCAA is a "recipient" of federal funds because
its members have given administrative and governing control of their in-
tercollegiate athletic programs to the NCAA and the NCAA directly
controls federal funds through their complete control of the NYSP
Fund.' 7 As a result, the Cureton court found "a nexus between the
NCAA's allegedly discriminatory conduct with regards to intercollegiate
athletics" and its receipt of federal funds, thus subjecting Proposition 16
to a Title VI challenge.
The second prong required the Cureton nonqualifiers to prove that the
minimum score requirement disparately impacted African-American
student-athletes."'9 The court held that the Cureton nonqualifiers dem-
102. See id. at 689.
103. See id. at 692-96.
104. Id. at 692. The Cureton nonqualifiers also attempted to argue that the NCAA
receives federal funds through the National Youth Sports Program Fund (NYSP Fund),
which is the NCAA's "alter ego." Id. at 692 & n.3 (explaining that the Fund "provides
summer education and sports instruction on the campuses of NCAA member and non-
member institutions" in an attempt to foster youth enrichment). The court originally ex-
pressed concern over the Fund in a memorandum written by Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter.
See Cureton v. NCAA, No. 97-131, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15529, at *7. (E.D. Pa. Oct. 8,
1997) (mem.). In the absence of a sufficient record, Buckwalter said that if the Fund
turned out to be a sham to disguise the NCAA's direct benefit from using federal funds,
then the NCAA would, in fact, receive federal financial assistance. Id.
105. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of the NCAA v.
Smith, 525 U.S. 469 (1999).
106. See Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 693 (maintaining that the Cureton nonqualifiers
may still combine this theory with other facts to prove the NCAA's receipt of federal
funds).
107. Id. at 692-96.
108. Id. at 696.
109. See id. at 689. The court concluded that "raising student-athlete graduation rates
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onstrated sufficient proof to sustain a Title VI claim and, therefore, de-
clared Proposition 16 illegal, and permanently enjoined its further use."0
The NCAA appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit granted a stay allowing Proposition 16 to continue."'
The Third Circuit reversed the lower court's decision in a 2-1 opinion
that never reached the merits of the case."2 The court struck down the
ruling because the NCAA is not a state actor."3 The panel reasoned that
Title VI bans intentional discrimination,"' but the Cureton suit involved
regulations that allow a claim of disparate impact."5 The court declined
to address whether the NCAA directly received federal funding and held
that the NCAA does not have to conform with Title VI and is not pre-.• . • 116
cluded from discriminating. The court continued to say that Title VI is
"program specific," meaning that the claims brought pursuant to the
regulations require the NCAA to receive federal funds directly."7
On the other hand, the language of Title VI recognizes an intentional
discrimination claim, which can sustain a suit with only indirect receipt of
federal funds."8 However, because the Cureton nonqualifiers' lawyers
brought this case under a disparate impact theory, they had to show that
the NCAA directly received the funds."' The court invalidated all of the
appellants' arguments, found that the NCAA directly received the funds,
and remanded the case to the district court for entry of summary judg-
is a legitimate goal of the NCAA, but closing the gap between black and white student-
athlete graduation rates is not." Id. at 706.
110. See id. at 712, 715. The court stated that the NCAA gave no evidence to support
the claim that minimum cutoff scores actually raised student-athlete graduation rates. Id.
at 712.
111. See NCAA Will Wait to Alter Eligibility Requirements, WASH. POST, Aug. 6,1999,
at D8. In the district court the NCAA unsuccessfully argued that a stay was necessary be-
cause invalidation of Proposition 16 would "cause chaos during the [upcoming] recruiting
period." Athelia Knight & Bill Brubaker, Court Grants NCAA a Stay on Proposition 16,
WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 1999 at D1.
112. See Cureton v. NCAA, 198 F.3d 107,118 (3rd Cir. 1999).
113. Seeid.at118.
114. See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-93 (1985); Guardians Ass'n v.
Civil Serv. Comm'n of the City of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 589, 592 (1983).
115. See Shannon P. Duffy, Attorneys Try to Revive NCAA-SA T Suit by Changing Le-
gal Theories, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 29, 2000, at 1 [hereinafter Duffy, Chang-
ing Legal Theories] (explaining that Title VI's implementing regulations allow such a
claim).
116. See Cureton, 198 F.3d at 114.
117. Id. at 115; see also Duffy, Changing Legal Theories, supra note 115, at 1.
118. See Cureton, 198 F.3d at 113; see also Duffy, Changing Legal Theories, supra note
115, at 1.
119. See Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 696-97.
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ment in favor of the NCAA."20
II. DETERMINING THE EFFECTS OF PROPOSITION 16: A STUDY IN
FUTILITY
Overruling the lower court on a technicality, the Third Circuit never
approached the merits regarding the legality of the NCAA's initial eligi-
bility standards.'' The Cureton lawyers tried to pursue other options be-
fore taking the case to the Supreme Court. 2  The lawyers filed an
amended complaint, alleging "purposeful discrimination" because the
court stated that the NCAA cannot be sued under a "disparate impact"
claim.' The plaintiffs hoped their change in legal theories would avoid
the Third Circuit's negative decision and allow the Cureton nonqualifiers
to sustain a viable claim against the NCAA.224 The court dismissed the
amended complaint, however, stating that "it was too late to change the
entire theory of the case."'2 5
A. Big Business or Student Fulfillment: Identifying the NCAA's Real
Purpose
The rapid development of college athletics into a multimillion dollar
business has challenged the NCAA in its effort to preserve academicS 126
standards. Unfortunately, colleges have realized the potential implica-
120. See Cureton, 198 F.3d at 118.
121. See id.; see also Jim Smith, The NCAA's Controversial Proposition 16 Lives On,
PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 24, 1999.
122. See Duffy, Changing Legal Theories, supra note 115, at 1.
123. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at 1, Cureton v. NCAA, 198 F.3d 107 (3rd Cir.
1999) (No. 97-131). A claim of intentional discrimination is recognized directly in the lan-
guage of the Title VI. See Duffy, Changing Legal Theories, supra note 115, at 1. On the
other hand, a disparate impact claim can be found only through the statute's implementing
regulations, which require direct receipt of federal funds to subject the NCAA to any kind
of suit. See id.
124. See Duffy, Changing Legal Theories, supra note 115, at 1. Adele P. Kimmel, one
of the attorneys for the Cureton nonqualifiers, was quoted as saying: "The battle is far
from over .... We will ask [the court] to rehear it. If necessary we'll ask the entire court
to hear arguments. I'm certain that no matter what the decision, both sides will want to
take it to the Supreme Court. This is that important." Joe Drape, Rehearing Sought in
Reversal on Test-Based Eligibility Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1999 at D4.
125. Shannon P. Duffy, Taking Another Shot at Changing the NCAA's Use of SAT
Standards, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 27, 2000, at 3 (quoting Ronald L. Buckwa-
ter, the U.S. district court judge who ruled in the first Cureton suit that "the NCAA's
Proposition 16 had an illegal disparate impact on black students").
126. See WEISSBERG, supra note 3, at 20. Immense television broadcast contracts
have helped television become a major source of revenue for universities. See SACK AND
STAUROWSKY, supra note 9, at 5. In 1996, CBS and the NCAA entered into a deal for
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tions of having a football or basketball powerhouse to the extent that
student-athlete's athletic talents have become more of a concern than
their academic failings.' Schools that exploit their student-athletes are
more inclined to overlook a student's 2.0 GPA or 700 SAT score and fo-
cus on his twenty-eight point averages or 350 passing yards per game be-
cause there is so much on the line.'
As a result of the high profile nature of college athletics, as well as
much-publicized functional illiterates,2 9 the NCAA greatly emphasizes
$1.75 billion, which gave CBS the right to broadcast the NCAA men's basketball tourna-
ment. See id. The NCAA and CBS recently renewed this agreement for 11 years for a
staggering $6 billion. See Leonard Shapiro & Mark Asher, CBS Retains NCAA: $6 Billion
for li-Year Deal, WASH PosT, Nov. 19, 1999, at DI. Beginning in 2003, the deal pays the
NCAA $545 million annually and runs until 2013. See id. Three weeks of televising the
NCAA basketball tournament costs more to air than entire seasons for all other profes-
sional sports except professional basketball and football. See id. The NCAA's own re-
quirements add to the commercialization of sports, including a requirement that Division
IA football programs maintain stadiums with at least a capacity of 30,000 and a paid at-
tendance average of 17,000 per home game. See SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 9, at
5.
127. See WEISSBERG, supra note 3, at 20-22 (pointing out that a college's entire image,
which includes cash, television deals, and even the expectations of entire states such as
Nebraska, Kansas, Kentucky, and Indiana, may ride, in part, on the shoulders of student-
athletes).
128. See generally id. at 22. Weissberg illustrates the case of Marcus Dupree, a 17
year-old, who possessed a tremendous combination of speed, power, and other intangible
factors for which college recruiters look. See id. at 49. Weissberg notes that Dupree's
"numbers" were not his SAT scores or GPA, but his 4.3 second 40 yard dash, 360 pound
bench press, 5,284 rushing yards, and 87 touchdowns throughout his high school career.
Id. A star athlete like Dupree may lead a school to a Final Four tournament appearance
or a football bowl appearance, which may earn a school upwards of $1 million. See
SPERBER, supra note 3, at 42 (explaining that the 1988 Final Four teams, which included
Kansas, Oklahoma, Duke, and Arizona, received $1,153,000 each, but actually took home
between $138,000-$840,000). For example, teams participating in either the Sugar Bowl or
the Rose Bowl earn their respective schools a payout of over $12.5 million. See Peter
Keating, Playoff Payoff, ESPN: THE MAGAZINE, Sept. 18, 2000 at 138. Conference "dis-
tributions" account for the discrepancy in the gross and net amounts each school earns and
receives. SPERBER, supra note 3, at 42. Each conference designates its own distribution
system to split the total amount earned by the remaining conference schools, which means
that only schools not involved in a conference retain their own earnings. See id. For ex-
ample, the Pacific-10 (Pac-10) Conference splits evenly all NCAA payouts with all confer-
ence members. See id. For example, in 1988 Arizona earned $1,153,000 for its Final Four
appearance and Oregon State earned $230,700 for its first-round appearance; however,
due to the even split, each Pac-10 school received $138,000. See id. The Atlantic Coast
Conference (ACC) permits its members to retain their own first-round earnings and 70%
of all other round earnings. See id. The NCAA gets its share as well: approximately 50%
of the tournament's total net receipts to pay "tournament expenses and to balance its own
books." Id. at 43.
129. See SPERBER, supra note 3, at 218; see also supra note 15 and accompanying text
(describing Dexter Manley and other college athletes who could not read after graduating
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the implementation and legitimacy of the stringent guidelines for in-
coming student athletes." Proposition 16, although subjected to chal-
lenge in Cureton,' is the most recent attempt to preserve the integrity of
college athletics. However, the district court's holding in Cureton attacks
the pervasive, yet subtle racism that Proposition 16 perpetuates."' Some
view Cureton to portray the NCAA as a problematic organization strug-
gling for control.'33
B. Identifying the Culprit: Pointing the Finger at the NCAA
1. Piercing the NCAA's Corporate Veil
Conceivably, the NCAA is responsible for the problem caused by
minimum initial eligibility standards.' The NCAA appears to hide be-
hind a veil of untouchability while it arbitrarily promulgates rules with
sweeping, yet largely unpopular implications.' Proponents of the posi-
tion that the NCAA is a state actor lament that member institutions have
little recourse against the NCAA and anything short of full-fledged sub-
from college).
130. See WEISSBERG, supra note 3, at 20-22. The American system is unique in that
universities "assume responsibility for providing the public with sports entertainment."
JAMES A. MICHENER, SPORTS IN AMERICA 188 (1976). It would be unheard of for Euro-
pean colleges and universities to award scholarships to an illiterate athlete solely for the
entertainment of that city's spectators. See id. ("Our system is an American phenome-
non, a historical accident which developed from the exciting football games played by
Yale and Harvard ... and certain other schools during the closing years of the nineteenth
century.").
131. See generally Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Pa. 1999), rev'd, 198 F.
3d 107 (3rd Cir. 1999), on remand to 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 4790 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2000),
reconsideration denied by 2000 U.S. LEXIS 6526 (E.D. Pa. May 12, 2000).
132. See generally id. at 714-17; Duffy, Changing Legal Theories, supra note 115, at 1
(quoting the Cureton plaintiff's attorneys to say that the litigation revealed "admissions
made by the NCAA that Proposition 16 was motivated by race").
133. See, e.g., John A. Reding & Peter C. Meier, Athletes Cry 'Foul!' Over NCAA
Rules, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 17, 1997, at B7 & nn.1-17 (indicating that Cureton has prompted
the NCAA to change its position through the threat of litigation and public criticism).
134. See HART-NIBBRIG & COTTINGHAM, supra note 3, at 93 (arguing for the imple-
mentation of new standards that could ultimately "raise the academic preparation of high
school athletes [that] should benefit furture college student-athletes").
135. See, e.g., Reding & Meier, supra note 133, at B7. The NCAA routinely receives
criticism for its "vague" and "voluminous" manual, which contains rules that all member
institutions are expected to comply with and enforce. Kevin E. Broyles, NCAA Regula-
tion of Intercollegiate Athletics: Time For a New Game Plan, 46 ALA. L. REV. 487, 507-08
(1995). However, "[tihe NCAA recognizes no defenses to rules violations other than that
the act did not occur." Id. at 508.
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mission to the NCAA is akin to institutional suicide.'
36
In NCAA v. Tarkanian, the Supreme Court concluded that "UNLV re-
tained the authority to withdraw from the NCAA and establish its own
standards."'37  The Court further stated, however, that "[n]either
UNLV's decision to adopt the NCAA's standards nor its minor role in
their formulation" was enough to conclude that the NCAA acted under
color of state law when it devised standards that govern athlete recruit-
ment, eligibility, and academic performance.' The U.S. district court in
Cureton v. NCAA acknowledged that member institutions, although pos-
sessing the ability to reject NCAA legislation, would be subject to severe
NCAA sanctions or "forced" to forgo NCAA membership if they did
so. 39 The Cureton court was the first court to realize that the NCAA has
power to create rules that universities must follow; it was also the first
court to classify the NCAA as a state actor and subject it to constitu-
tional claims. 40
Unfortunately, little recourse is available to college student-athletes in
the event that universities exploit them for the school's own athletic pur-
136. See generally Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276
(W.D. Okla. 1982). This district court explained:
It is true that membership is voluntary in the sense that a member institution may
withdraw from NCAA at any time. However, it is clear from the evidence that
an institution which withdraws or is expelled from the NCAA could no longer
operate a fully-rounded intercollegiate athletic program. Non-member institu-
tions could not compete in the prestigious NCAA championship events in such
sports as baseball, basketball, track, swimming, wrestling and gymnastics. They
would therefore be unable to recruit quality athletes into their programs. Its
football team could not play on television against members of the NCAA. As a
practical matter, membership in the NCAA is a prerequisite for institutions
wishing to sponsor a major, well-rounded athletic program.
Id. at 1288.
137. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 194-95 (1988).
138. Id. at 195; see also generally Board of Regents, 546 F. Supp. at 1276. It is worth
noting that the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decisions in Board of Regents,
finding that the NCAA held a monopoly and that "by curtailing output and blunting the
ability of member institutions to respond to consumer preference, the NCAA has re-
stricted rather than enhanced the place of intercollegiate athletics in the Nation's life."
NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
139. Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 695-96 (E.D. Pa. 1999), rev'd, 198 F. 3d
107 (3rd Cir. 1999), on remand to 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 4790 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2000), re-
consideration denied by 2000 U.S. LEXIS 6526 (E.D. Pa. May 12, 2000) (realizing that ei-
ther situation results in "grave consequences" for member institutions). Member institu-
tions must comply with the NCAA's laws or face sanctions. See id. at 695 (explaining that
legislation adopted by the NCAA, such as Proposition 16, becomes "enforceable and
binding" upon member institutions).
140. Id. at 696.
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poses. 4' Ross v. Creighton University142 illustrates the problems student-
athletes face exacting revenge on a school that abused them. The Dis-
trict Court in Creighton did not find that the university negligently admit-
ted Ross as a matter of public policy. 143 The court stated that a negligent
admission action would unduly burden schools and jeopardize marginal
students' chances of attending college if schools were required to factor
costs of tort damages resulting from negligent admission actions into ad-
missions decisions.'" This decision leaves contract principles as the nar-
row opening for students to redress their grievances with the university.
In light of the lower court's initial ruling in Cureton, chances of success• • 146
against the NCAA are improving. The new suit filed by Cureton's at-
torneys, for example, may prove a more effective way to attack the
NCAA and Proposition 16.14' The NCAA is no longer as indestructible,
and perhaps this, litigation will cause the NCAA to readjust its policies. 14
8
At a minimum, the Cureton litigation indicates a breakdown in the
NCAA's formerly strong legal position. 9
141. See SHROPSHIRE, IN BLACK AND WHITE, supra note 24, at 126-27.
142. 957 F.2d. 410, 411-13. (7th Cir. 1992).
143. Id. at 413.
144. See id.
145. See SHROPSHIRE, IN BLACK AND WHITE, supra note 24, at 127.
146. See Reding & Meier, supra note 133, at B7 (comparing the chance of a victory
against the NCAA with defeating Notre Dame on its home turf: "hard-fought and hard to
come by"). The NCAA also lost a devastating case that cost the NCAA $67 million. See
Mark Conrad, Latest Jury Award Slam-Dunks the NCAA, N.Y.L.J., May 15, 1998, at 1.
Courts have awarded more than 1,900 coaches with $22.3 million (which automatically tri-
ples under the Clayton Act) because the NCAA conspired to restrain the winning
coaches' salaries with its "restricted-earnings" rule. Id. at 1. This rule, promulgated be-
cause of the increasing costs of Title IX compliance in the early 1990s, required one coach
in every sport other than football to be designated "a restricted earnings coach" and lim-
ited that coach's earnings to $12,000 for the academic year and $4,000 during the summer.
Id. A group of these coaches challenged the rule and won because the court concluded
that the price fixing, referred to as a horizontal restraint on competition, unreasonably re-
strained competition. Id.
147. See supra note 96 (discussing the new case filed by the same law firm involved in
the initial Cureton suit); Duffy, Changing Legal Theories, supra note 115, at 1.
148. See Duffy, Changing Legal Theories, supra note 115, at 1 (suggesting that the re-
cent litigation has led to this new development); see generally Reding & Meier, supra note
133, at B7. Future litigation against the NCAA is likely. See id. The U.S. Department of
Justice recently notified the NCAA that it believes that the association's initial eligibility
requirements discriminate against learning-disabled students. See id.
149. See generally Reding & Meier, supra note 133, at B7. Others have claimed that
the NCAA should be subject to judicial review. See, e.g., Porto, supra note 19, at 133 (us-
ing the example of restoration of eligibility to support his claim). Because the NCAA ex-
hibits "exclusive control" over college athletics and, in turn, the student-athlete's eligibility
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2. The NCAA's Search for Effective Minimum Requirements: A
Premature Result?
That NCAA athletic administrators, instead of admissions experts,
created Proposition 48 without relying on any scientific evidence, ex-
plains the harsh criticism it has received. 5 One group of athletic admin-
istrators established 700 as the minimum SAT score, but did not use any
scientific evidence to reach this decision.15' Further angering opponents
is the fact that no African-Americans participated in the original creation
of the rule.'52 According to the College Board, the sponsor of the SAT,
African-American students entering college in 1981 attained an average
SAT score of 694, while their white counterparts averaged an SAT score
of 925.53 Despite not considering this data in reaching its decision, the
NCAA Convention still approved this measure in 1983.114
The most serious charge levied against the NCAA claimed that the de-
velopment of initial eligibility rules was fueled by a racist desire to ex-
clude African-American athletes in response to their dominance in col-
lege sports. 55 This damaging proposition gains credibility by the fact that
for financial aid and a professional athletic career, the integrity of the system essentially
depends on judicial review. Id. The argument, however, emphasizes judicial deference to
the NCAA in cases where a student-athlete earns a degree. See id. at 134. Either way,
judicial review may promote constructive change because it would remind the NCAA that
"its failure to respond legislatively to its critics will [result in] protracted, expensive, and
potentially embarrassing litigation." Id.
150. See DEALY, supra note 28, at 114; see also SHROPSHIRE, IN BLACK AND WHITE,
supra note 24, at 1.08-09 (reporting that African-Americans criticized Proposition 48 for its
failure to include African-Americans). The participants, including Big Eight Conference
commissioner Chuck Neinas, Vince Dooley of Georgia, Joe Paterno of Penn State, Bobby
Knight of Indiana, Dean Smith of North Carolina, and Don Canham of Michigan, con-
vened at Sapelo Island, Georgia to draft the proposal. See DEALY, supra note 28 at 114.
The American Council on Education (ACE), a trade association of the nation's top uni-
versities, organized another group headed by Harvard University's Derek Bok. See id.
The so-called "Bok Committee," attended the 1983 NCAA Convention hoping to reform
the Sapelo Island Group's proposals. Id. At the convention athletic directors and faculty
athletic representatives shrewdly convinced the NCAA to adopt an amendment to accept
"partial qualifiers." Id. at 115. The concept of the "partial qualifier," unbeknownst to the
"Bok Committee," permitted the recruiting practices that Proposition 48 attempted to
eliminate. Id.
151. See DEALY, supra note 28, at 114.
152. See SHROPSHIRE, IN BLACK AND WHITE, supra note 24, at 108. Reverend Jesse
Jackson was perturbed by the omission of blacks on the panel: "When we read about a
proposition, and we were not involved in discussing or writing the proposition, that is in-
sulting." Id. at 103.
153. See Brubaker, supra note 76, at D4.
154. See DEALY, supra note 28, at 114-15.
155. See Linda S. Greene, The New NCAA Rules of the Game: Academic Integrity or
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the NCAA must have known of the staggering standardized test discrep-
ancies that occurred along racial lines prior to the adoption of the rules.'56
The district court in Cureton recognized the arbitrary nature by which
the NCAA standard developed and consequently found that a disparate
impact existed.57 The NCAA's memoranda, studies, and admissions rec-
ognize these shortcomings. However, the NCAA continuously argues
that the cutoff score causes no disparate impact based on a comparison
of ineligibility standards under Proposition 16 and other equally effec-
tive, less discriminatory alternatives.'59 The Cureton plaintiffs advocated
much needed change within the NCAA system.' 6
C. Minimum Standards: Negatives, Positives, and False Positives
1. A Minority of Approval: Looking for a Diamond in the Rough
Proponents of Proposition 16 and eligibility standards reason that the
minimum standards are absolutely necessary and claim that some of
those who question the academic standards may possess ulterior mo-
tives. 161 Other proponents claim that tougher standards give credibility to
162the universities and increase the quality of the schools. Proponents
need only point to the increased graduation rates since the implementa-
tion of Proposition 48 and Proposition 16.163 Unfortunately, statistics that
Racism?, 28 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 101, 117 & n.81 (1984) (referring to a 1983 telephone con-
versation with Jesse Stone, President of Southern University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana).
156. See id. at 117.
157. Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 700-01 (E.D. Pa. 1999), rev'd, 198 F. 3d
107 (3rd Cir. 1999), on remand to 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 4790 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2000), re-
consideration denied by 2000 U.S. LEXIS 6526 (E.D. Pa. May 12, 2000).
158. See generally Memorandum, supra note 14; Brief for Appellees, supra note 14.
159. See Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d. at 699-700; Brief for Appellees, supra note 14, at 30.
160. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 14, at 28-29; see generally Memorandum, su-
pra note 14.
161. See, e.g., Leroy D. Clark, New Directions for the Civil Rights Movement: College
Athletics as a Civil Rights Issue, 36 How. L.J. 259, 274 (1993) (mentioning that the stan-
dards may be a "ploy of some with ulterior racist motivations").
162. See Mark Asher & Jon DeNunzio, Student-Athletes Find It Harder To Stay in
Game, WASH. POST, May 28, 1995, at Al; see also WEISSBERG, supra note 3, at 24-25 (il-
lustrating a Proposition 48 success story). Rumeal Robinson entered the University of
Michigan in one of the first classes subject to Proposition 48 and sat out that year because
of his low test scores. See id. Robinson acclimated himself to college life, led the Wol-
verines to the 1989 National Championship, and graduated the following year. See id. at
25.
163. See SHROPSHIRE, IN BLACK AND WHITE, supra note 24, at 109. The freshman
class of 1986-1987 was the first class affected by Proposition 48 and experienced a gradua-
tion rate of 57%-an increase of six percent from the pre-Proposition 48 classes of 1983,
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support Proposition 48's great strides, when compared to graduation
rates of nonstudent-athletes during the same period, are misleading be-
cause the student-athlete net increase is far less than the NCAA boasts.
1 6
Furthermore, a significant percentage of the educational problems exist
in men's basketball and football, which further skews the statistics.165 In
fact, only 30% of college football players and 27% percent of college
basketball players graduate.
6 6
Another argument for Proposition 16 is that such a rule is needed to
encourage young children to study because they will know in advance
what it takes to be the next Michael Jordan. 67 If the new rule can force
young students to study, it will "lead to a generation of college athletes
[earning] degrees.', 66 For that to be true, however, educators must make
a radical change and stress academics over athletics. 16  Supporters ofminimum standards point to the problems of grade inflation and incon-
1984, and 1985. See Brief for Appellant at 9, Cureton v. NCAA, 198 F.3d 107 (3rd Cir.
1.999) (No. 97-131) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant]; SHROPSHIRE, IN BLACK AND
WHITE, supra note 24, at 108. During the same time period, African-Americans experi-
enced a nine percent increase in their graduation rates. Id. at 109. By 1989, black gradua-
tion rates had reached 46% (11% higher than before to Proposition 48). See Brief for
Appellant, supra, at 9. Another rarely mentioned statistic states that on a national scale,
athlete graduation rates are higher than nonathletes (52% versus 41.5%). See McKerrow
& Daly, supra note 1, at 63-64.
164. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 14, at 45. Based on slightly different numbers,
student-athlete graduation rates rose 7.5% following Proposition 48 which was only, at
best, a 2.5% net increase in the graduation rate. See id. at 44-45. Evidence also shows that
this slight increase may have no correlation between graduation rates and Proposition 48,
but may be a result of other factors. See id. at 45-46.
165. See RICHARD E. LAPCHICK, The High School Student-Athlete: Root of the Ethical
Issues in College Sport, in THE RULES OF THE GAME: ETHICS IN COLLEGE SPORTS 17, 19
(1994) (identifying the illiteracy rate among high school football and basketball players at
25 to 30%, which is more than twice the national high school average).
166. See id. Perhaps the length of the college basketball season, which begins October
15 and for the teams reaching the NCAA championship does not end until early April,
contributes to the low graduation rate among college basketball players. See Louis Bar-
bash, Student-Athletes Should Be Athletes First, in SPORTS IN AMERICA: OPPOSING
VIEWPOINTS 73, 79 (William Dudley ed., 1994). Therefore, many college basketball play-
ers only have one month at the beginning of the academic school year and one month at
the end to focus solely on academics. See id. During the season these players must focus
not only on school, but also on practice, weight lifting, conditioning, team meetings, film
sessions, and games. See id.
167. Cf. GOLENBOCK, supra note 38, at 3 (explaining what is needed to get children to
focus on their studies). As Golenbock points out, "[1]ook, kid, if you don't study, you
don't get to be Michael Jordon." Id.
168. Id.
169. See id.; see also HART-NIBBRIG & COrrINGHAM, supra note 3, at 94 (explaining
the difficulty of separating college athletics from professional sports).
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sistent GPA calculations by different high schools.7 As the situation
now exists, the NCAA has no choice but to stress the importance of edu-
cation and to use Proposition 16 to promote integrity despite its many
failings.'
2. The Negatives of Proposition 16 and the SAT's Failing as a
Barometer
Despite the general positive elements of Proposition 16 and the eligi-
bility standards, there are significant flaws in their use and application.'
Opponents of Proposition 16 and eligibility standards scoff at their exis-
tence,'73 and fend off advocates who point to higher graduation rates for
both African-Americans and student-athletes in general.14  African-
American educators offer heavy criticism regarding Proposition 48, the
original eligibility requirements, preceding Proposition 16.17' They con-
tend that these measures unfairly affect African-American student-
athletes because blacks typically score below the minimum cutoff SAT
score more often than their white counterparts. 1 6 Others claim that the
SAT's verbal section is culturally biased against African-American stu-
dents.' 7 Others also claim that the NCAA's eligibility requirements en-
courage high school students to take easier classes to receive "A's" and
"B's" instead of taking substantive classes.
178
Notwithstanding the benefits gained by a Proposition 16 student sitting
out his first year to study, some college coaches criticize Proposition 16
for negatively affecting a great number of potential student-athletes. 179 A
coach under a tremendous amount of pressure to win immediately may
170. See Memorandum, supra note 14, at 753a.
171. See generally Pentimone, supra note 13.
172. See supra notes 96-120 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., Pentimone, supra note 13, at 473-74. Some studies show that high school
GPAs are better predictors of academic success than standardized tests. See Russ Gough,
The Hard Facts on Propositions 48 and 16, SPORTING NEWS, Sept. 26, 1994, at 11.
174. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., SPERBER, supra note 3, at 220.
176. See, e.g., id.
177. See, e.g., SHROPSHIRE, IN BLACK AND WHITE, supra note 24, at 111.
178. Pentimone, supra note 13, at 498. Some students, as a result, do not take classes
based on content because a low grade in a difficult course may result in ineligibility. See
Asher & DeNunzio, supra note 162, at Al (quoting Gonzaga High School basketball
coach, Dick Meyers).
179. Cf SHROPSHIRE, IN BLACK AND WHITE, supra note 24, at 109 (commenting that
some students possess the potential to succeed, but are not given the chance to do so be-
cause they fall short of the NCAA's Proposition 48 minimum standards).
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not recruit someone who must sit out an entire season. 18 Another prob-
lem is that many student-athletes failing to satisfy the minimum stan-
dards lose one year of eligibility. 8
These criticisms prevail because Proposition 16 relies heavily on stan-
dardized testing.' In Groves v. Alabama State Board of Education,83 the
district court found that a minimum ACT score requirement caused a
disparate impact."4 The court also enjoined the State Board from further
using the ACT as a method for screening the competency of future
teachers because such a requirement violated the plaintiffs' Title VI
rights.'85 Groves, like Cureton, challenged the legitimacy of the particular
180. See ALEXANDER WOLFF & ARMEN KETEYIAN, RAW RECRUITS 22-23 (1991)
(explaining that coaches may be motivated by ego, competitive pride, or job security). On
the other hand, many coaches take advantage of Proposition 16. See NCAA Eligibility
Mess: Fear of Commitment, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 12, 1999, at 31 [hereinafter Eligi-
bility Mess]. The NCAA only allows schools to offer 25 football scholarships per season.
See id. Coaches, however, often overbook their recruits under the assumption that Propo-
sition 16 will render a few of them ineligible to play during their first year. See id; see also
WOLFF & KETEYIAN, supra, at 131. Schools that engage in this practice are referred to as
"airline schools." Id. A coach may sign a few high school seniors in the fall, a few more in
the spring, and maybe a couple of junior-college transfers, leaving him with "more passen-
gers than room. Somebody has to get bumped." Id. at 132. Coaches justify this practice
by allowing themselves to believe that "natural selection" will reduce the roster to its al-
lowed size. Id. If the court had decided not to enforce the stay in Cureton, many coaches
who overbooked could have violated the NCAA's scholarship limits. See Eligibility Mess,
supra, at 31. Student-athletes sign legally binding letters of intent, but coaches work
around those letters by allowing players to walk-on, go to junior college, or enroll in the
spring instead of in the fall. See id. Coaches use this ploy to give them a deeper pool of
talent. See id.
181. See Phil Taylor, Blackboards and Backboards, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 9,
1992, at 149 (suggesting that prep schools may benefit students and schools by increasing
student SAT scores).
182. See Pentimone, supra note 13, at 496. One of the most outspoken critics of initial
eligibility standards is Temple University men's basketball coach John Chaney. See Stall-
man, supra note 14, at ID. Chaney simply does not believe that one test can determine
whether a student can succeed in college. See Michael Bradley, One-Two Punch,
SPORTING NEWS, Jan. 17, 1994, at 36; see also generally Gary Smith, The Whittler, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 28, 1994, at 72. Chaney has said that Propositions 16 and 48 merely
cut off the bottom of the barrel to raise graduation rates, but simultaneously take away
opportunities, from blacks in particular, to attend college. See SHROPSHIRE, IN BLACK
AND WHITE, supra note 24, at 103 (quoting Chaney).
183. 776 F. Supp. 1518 (M.D. Ala. 1991).
184. See id. at 1531. In this case, the plaintiffs brought a class action suit under Title
VI to challenge the Alabama State Board of Education's requirement that college sopho-
mores achieve a 16 on the ACT in order to participate in undergraduate teaching pro-
grams. See id. at 1519. The plaintiff's complaint included claims of "disparate impact" and
"disparate treatment" and sought injunctive relief against further enforcement of the
minimum ACT score requirement. Id.
185. See id. at 1519, 1532.
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cutoff score, but not the broader issue of using the ACT as a factor in
admission to teacher-training programs."'
In Groves, the committee used policy implications and ignored statisti-
cal evidence to set the minimum standards, just as the Proposition 48
groups did.187 The court in Groves invalidated the minimum standard
and questioned the state's "homemade methodologies," effectively par-
alleling many of the problems minimum eligibility standards create.'88
Although neither Cureton nor Groves eliminated the use of a test as a
minimum standard, those courts forced administrators to be more thor-
ough in adopting standards that have broad implications."89
Standardized test statistics dramatically illustrate the inherent problem
of relying on this method to differentiate students.' 90 The national col-
lege-bound average SAT score for student-athletes is approximately
900.191 Proposition 16 weighs the students' SAT/ACT scores more heav-
ily than their GPAs.'92 Therefore, more than fifteen percent of students
taking these tests may be affected by the standardized test cut-off score,
while less than three percent will be affected by the GPA minimum.9
This emphasis on standardized test scores means that failure to satisfy
the minimum requirement may explain a student's ineligibility.
94
186. Id. at 1530 (declining to consider the particular cutoff score as "educationally jus-
tified" because the ACT may be an inappropriate measure of a teacher's competency).
187. Id. at 1520-21; see also DEALY, supra note 28, at 114. One committee member
explains how the committee reached this disturbing decision:
Finally somebody said, well, what can we take to the people? What kind of ar-
gument we can make that the people gon [sic] buy? And some soul in there said,
well could we make the argument that the teachers ought to be smarter than half
the students .... Everybody will buy it .... We said, we can sell that .... So
[one of the steering committee members] was commissioned to go to his office
and find out what the average ACT was for graduates, came back and said, I be-
lieve it's 16.4. So our big decision was whether to go to 17 or 16 .... Of course,
this is also a fallacious argument because the student-the teacher never is as
smart as half the students .... [T]hat was the scientific basis of it gentleman and
lady. It was just that scientific.
Groves, 776 F. Supp. at 1521 (alteration in original).
188. Groves, 776 F. Supp. at 1532 (implying that the State needs to be more profes-
sional in adopting rather important policies).
189. Id.; see generally Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Pa. 1999), rev'd, 198
F. 3d 107 (3rd Cir. 1999), on remand to 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 4790 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13,
2000), reconsideration denied by 2000 U.S. LEXIS 6526 (E.D. Pa. May 12, 2000).
190. See, e.g., Groves, 776 F. Supp. at 1518; Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 687.
191. See McKerrow and Daly, supra note 1, at 62.
192. See Memorandum, supra note 14, at 756a.
193. See id.
194. See SHROPSHIRE, IN BLACK AND WHITE, supra note 24, at 111-14.
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Over the past two decades, white student-athletes have attained an av-
erage SAT score of approximately 930, while their African-Americans
counterparts scored approximately 200 points lower during that same pe-
riod .'9 This disparity questions the quality of education that black and
white communities receive, and suggests that many black students are
unaware or unable to afford SAT preparatory classes. '" There is no gen-
eral consensus on exactly what causes the divide, 97 which makes the
NCAA's decision to use the SAT scores as a standard even more dis-
couraging and confusing. The Educational Testing Service (ETS), the
organization that created the SAT, has specifically requested that the
NCAA abandon the SAT as a means to establish eligibility standards;
however, the NCAA continues to use this controversial standard.'98
D. Examining the Minimum Standard Alternatives
The current standards may exclude students who have the capability of
succeeding at and graduating from Division I schools despite low test
scores or GPAs.'99 There are problems associated with the current mini-
mum cutoff scores.2°° For example, a student with a 2.5 GPA and an 820
195. See id. at 111.
196. Seeid. at 111-12.
197. See id.; SACK AND STAUROWSKY, supra note 9, at 98-99.
198. See Gough, supra note 173, at 11 (questioning why the NCAA continues to use
the SAT to determine eligibility when the experts entertain serious questions).
199. See Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp. 2d 687, 712 & n.33 (E.D. Pa. 1999), rev'd, 198
F. 3d 107 (3rd Cir. 1999), on remand to 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 4790 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13,
2000), reconsideration denied by 2000 U.S. LEXIS 6526 (E.D. Pa. May 12, 2000); see also
Brief for Appellees, supra note 14, at 41; SHROPSHIRE, IN BLACK AND WHITE, supra note
24, at 109. Had Proposition 48 been used in 1981, 69% of all black male athletes would
not have met its standards; however, 54% of these athletes graduated. See id. (citing
Richard Lapchick of Northeastern University's Center for the Study of Sport in Society).
This statistic indicates that these students possessed the ability to succeed, but just needed
help to develop. See id. (quoting Richard Lapchick). The NCAA published a 1977 study
demonstrating similar results. See SPERBER, supra note 3, at 220. Gonzaga High School
in Washington, D.C. informally studied the transition from Proposition 48 to Proposition
16, which created a higher standard. See Asher & DeNunzio, supra note 162, at Al. The
study discovered that 34 Gonzaga students who received college athletic scholarships
would have been ineligible under the new rule, yet 31 out of the 34 students graduated
from college and three remained in school. See id. Had Proposition 48 or Proposition 16
existed at the time these 34 students received their scholarships, they would not have
qualified and would have been branded "Proposition 48 [or 16] casualties." SHROPSHIRE,
IN BLACK AND WHITE, supra note 24, at 109. To further illustrate the point, University of
Georgia Athletic Director, Vince Dooley, said that he "once had a black football player
who had a 480 on the SAT and he actually graduated. Today, he's a judge." Brubaker,
supra note 76, at Dl.
200. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 14, at 40-41 (explaining the arbitrary nature of
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SAT score may qualify, but a student with a 3.0 GPA and a 600 SAT
score will be ineligible even though both students have the same prob-
ability of graduating.' In Cureton, the district court found that the
plaintiffs showed that "at least three alternative practices [existed] re-
sulting in less racial disproportionality while still serving the NCAA's
goal of raising student-athlete graduation rates . ,.0' The NCAA and
the Cureton court also examined three alternatives to Proposition 16.203
Under the first alternative, partial qualifiers would be considered full
qualifiers by lowering the SAT minimum score to 720 (or 59 on the
ACT) and extending the sliding-scale to a 2.750 GPA.2 4 Despite this
adjustment, the lowest standardized test score would remain higher, in
relation to the national norm, than the minimum required high school
grades. What the court does not mention is that this model would only
have affected 412 students, or one percent of the total number of stu-
dent-athletes registered under the NCAA Initial-Eligibility Clearing-
house, had this rule been in effect in 1997 instead of Proposition 16 .
Because African-Americans composed the majority of those potentially
affected, this rule is expected to produce a small increase in the propor-
tion of African-Americans meeting the eligibility standards.07
The second alternative, known as Model 3, would also make partial
qualifiers full qualifiers.0 8 Model 3 would also lower the minimum SAT
score to 600, provided that the student obtained a 3.050 GPA in accor-
dance with the sliding scale. 2°' This system would eliminate complaints
that the SAT is weighed too heavily because a score of 600 is two devia-
tions below the national average, as is a 2.000 GPA.2 ° In 1997, this sce-
nario would have only affected thirty students (or 0.1%) of all the Divi-
sion I hopefuls who had SAT scores between 600 and 710 coupled with a
the cutoff scores and how they affect similarly situated students).
201. See id.; see also DICK VITALE'S SLAM BAM JAM (ESPN television broadcast,
Nov. 9, 1999) [hereinafter SLAM BAM JAM] (arguing that the NCAA must eliminate the
distinction between a nonqualifier and a partial qualifier).
202. Cureton, 37 F. Supp. at 714 (indicating that the plaintiffs satisfied their burden
under Title VI).
203. Id.; see generally Memorandum, supra note 14.
204. See Cureton, 37 F. Supp. at 713; see generally Memorandum, supra note 14.
205. See Cureton, 37 F. Supp. at 713; see generally Memorandum, supra note 14.
206. See Memorandum, supra note 14, at 758a.
207. See id.
208. See Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 713.
209. See id.
210. See Memorandum, supra note 14, at 760a; see also Cureton, 37 F. Supp. at 713.
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GPA score high enough to make them full qualifiers."'
The final alternative eliminates the minimum GPA and SAT scores
and shifts strictly to a "test-grades combination.",212 In 1997, only twenty-
three student-athletes (or 0.1%) had a GPA below 2.000 and an SAT or
ACT score high enough to meet the sliding scale standard."' This model,
the NCAA's least preferred alternative, projects the highest student-
athlete graduation rate of any of the choices at 59.8% .
III. THE NCAA's SELF-SERVING PRACTICES MUST COME TO AN END
The NCAA does what is best for the NCAA, but this strategy is fail-
215ing. The NCAA regularly professes its desire for academic values, yet
fails to enact rules that promote these values because such rules may in-
fringe upon gate receipts or disregard college sports as public and com-S 216
mercial endeavors. Some of the NCAA's recent decisions defy com-
mon sense by strictly adhering to such nonsensical rules.217 The NCAA
211. See Memorandum, supra note 14, at 760a.
212. Id. at 761a; see also Cureton, 37 F. Supp. at 713-14.
213. See Memorandum, supra note 14, at 760a.
214. See Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 714 (stating that this alternative yields the highest
student-athlete graduation rate). The student-athlete graduation rate in 1985, the year
before Proposition 48 was enacted, was 52%. See id.
215. See Barbash, supra note 166, at 75. One argument proposes that the NCAA's
downfall may be attributed to its minimum authority to "deal with inherently contradic-
tory goals." HART-NIBBRIG & COTTINGHAM, supra note 3, at 83. By encouraging colle-
giate sports, the NCAA attempts to support academic values; unfortunately, it simultane-
ously promotes the commercialization of collegiate sports. See id. As a result, the NCAA
has allowed a system that is antithetical to amateurism to persist. See id. at 99. Despite
sanctions imposed by the NCAA, schools routinely violate NCAA rules and do not re-
form their illegal practices. See id.
216. See LAWRENCE, supra note 23, at 121-22 (describing the NCAA as a "cartel" that
restricts production and raises prices). As a classic cartel, the NCAA affects the amount
of athlete compensation, which "falls well below what a skilled athlete could command in
a free market," and limits the amount of games a school can play in an attempt to reap the
surplus input and output benefits. Id. at 122; see also SACK AND STAUROWSKY, supra
note 9, at 79 (explaining that since its founding the NCAA has not enforced any legislation
to limit gate receipts or retard the corporate mentality surrounding college athletics).
217. See, e.g., WEISSBERG, supra note 3, at 31. The NCAA's strict adherence to these
rules is best illustrated by the experience of Tracy Graham, a member of Iowa State Uni-
versity's women's volleyball team. See id. at 30. Although Graham easily satisfied the
minimum ACT score of 17 and had a B+ high-school average, the NCAA ruled Graham
ineligible, because she unknowingly took the ACT on a day that the NCAA did not sanc-
tion. See id. Graham had competed in a high school track meet on the approved date, but
the NCAA still deemed her ineligible on this technicality. See id. Graham and Iowa State
appealed to four different NCAA committees; she was finally granted eligibility, but after
missing an entire volleyball season. See id. at 31.
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enacted initial eligibility regulations under the veil of academic integrity,
but mainly to correct its own problems caused by academic scandal and
diminishing credibility. 218 Despite damaging evidence to the contrary, the
NCAA denies that Proposition 16 disparately impacts certain students
and continues to insist that its own alternatives are suitable to bringing
about the desired change .2 " The NCAA is at the heart of this problem
and is responsible for creating this damaging commercial mentality.
20
A change is needed in the world of college athletics.221 Current genera-
218. See Greene, supra note 155, at 109-10 (stating that scandals and problems forced
the NCAA to address these "more pressing objective[s]"). According to one author,
Proposition 48 "marked a step toward a fundamental transformation or reassertion of the
NCAA's authority." HART-NIBBRIG & COTTINGHAM, supra note 3, at 93. Seen in this
manner, a strong case is made for the NCAA to refrain from making decisions in response
to market attitudes as in the case of Proposition 48. See id. Since the NCAA imple-
mented Proposition 48, the allocation of scholarships to African-American freshmen has
dropped from 27.6% to 23.2%. See SHROPSHIRE, IN BLACK AND WHITE, supra note 24,
at 104. These decreases occurred in the face of NCAA predictions of a statistical upturn
that has not yet materialized. See Shropshire, Colorblind Propositions, supra note 23, at
142. The NCAA's data show, by its own admission, that Proposition 16 disproportionately
affects African-Americans. See Memorandum, supra note 14, at 756a (admitting that the
disparate impact is seen mainly among African-American student-athletes, but also affects
other ethnic-minorities). The student, prior to qualifying under Proposition 16, must reg-
ister with an NCAA Intitial-Eligibility Clearinghouse to verify his grades and scores. See
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 42, art. 14.3.1. For a full discussion regarding the NCAA
Eligibility Clearinghouse, see generally Reding & Meier, supra note 133.
219. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 163, at 42.
220. See HART-NItBBRIG & COYFINGHAM, supra note 3, at 99 (blaming the NCAA for
creating the commercial system "by helping [universities] to amass financial resources and
to distribute such resources" to NCAA colleges and universities).
221. See, e.g., Ken Denlinger, Addressing 'Hypocrisy' in College Sports, WASH. POST,
Oct. 22, 1999, at D7. The NCAA's cartel characteristics show "it is clear that an organiza-
tion once dominated by altruistically motivated people concerned only with the 'good of
the game' is now functioning like most other businesses, concentrating on product de-
mand, competition, and employees' wages." LAWRENCE, supra note 23, at xv. The
NCAA's analysts even have recommended to the NCAA that it eliminate cutoff scores.
See Brief for Appellees, supra note 14, at 42. In 1991 and 1994, an NCAA Academic Re-
quirements Committee recommended a rule without a minimum cutoff. See id. at 42-43.
Other NCAA research staff members have also allegedly recommended elimination of the
cutoff standard because:
[N]o predictor.., should be used as a single cutoff for eligibility in college. We
show that a test score or grades used as single cut-points (as in the current rule)
are less accurate, and do more damage than the two used in a linear combination.
This is especially true of Blacks who are subjected to a single cut on the test
score; they are excluded at a rate that is far higher than Whites, and their poten-
tial for success is higher than Whites at the same level. Thus, under that type of
rule we are excluding an inordinate number of Blacks who would actually suc-
ceed in college.
Id. at 43.
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tions of student-athletes often receive empty promises. Part of the
blame for the problems associated with college athletics must fall on the
coaches."' The athlete watches his coach make millions of dollars in sal-
ary and endorsements-much more than many professional athletes. 4
The athlete must question what the NCAA does with the millions it re-
ceives each year from television contracts.2 If a coach asks a student-
athlete to work on his jump shot or lift weights, a student-athlete will un-
222. See GOLENBOCK, supra note 38, at 5 (saying that schools have told students they
will eventually have professional careers in order to secure the students' enrollment).
Authors have described this game as "corporate athleticism," which describes the influ-
ence of business on college sports and reinforces the idea of college sports as big business.
HART-NIBBRIG & COTTINGHAM, supra note 3, at 1. Being number one, securing large
gate revenue and numerous television appearances, hiring the right coaches, and recruit-
ing the star "blue chip" athlete to produce that revenue lie at the heart of this concept. Id.
Corporate athleticism describes the process through which colleges generate revenue and
emphasizes the meaning of each step in the process. See id. at 7 ("[The school] expends
great effort (investment) to recruit, train, and develop top athletes (workers) and to find
and reward 'winning' coaches (management). Winning football or basketball (the prod-
uct) will then generate, if all goes well, substantial gate receipts and numerous television
contracts (profit).").
223. See Alexander Wolff & Dean Smith, Dean Smith Unplugged, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 22, 1997, at 50; see also SACK AND STAUROWSKY, supra note 9, at
100. The case of Gary Colson, New Mexico University's basketball coach from 1987 to
1988, exemplifies the pressure to win that coaches feel. See WOLFF & KETEYIAN, supra
note 180, at 123-25. Colson's squad fell short of an NCAA tournament bid, but received
an invitation to the National Invitation Tournament (NIT). See id. at 124-25. Colson's
bosses regarded the NIT as a consolation prize. See id. at 125. They fired him for his in-
ability to take the team to "the next level" despite the fact that his players graduated, in-
volved themselves in the community, and did not violate NCAA rules. Id. Colson simply
did not win enough; it cost him his job. See id.
224. See, e.g., WOLFF & KETEYIAN, supra note 180, at 130. Basketball coaches can
earn tremendous amounts of money from shoe endorsements (e.g., Nike, Converse, and
Reebok), TV and radio shows, speaking engagements and motivational lectures, which
can bring $5,000 to $10,000 each, and renting out the school's gymnasium for basketball
camps. See id.
225. See Mark Asher, NCAA Ponders Paying Athletes: TV-Rights Money Spurs Dis-
cussion, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1999, at DI; see also supra note 126 and accompanying text
(describing television broadcast contracts). In 1999 the NCAA made approximately $283
million, with $226 million from television revenue and the remaining amount from ticket
sales, licensing, royalty fees, and investments. See Asher, supra, at D1. That total amount
breaks down as follows: $140,650,000 distributed to Division I conferences and schools;
$54,911,000 for division-specific expenses, including the operation of Division I champion-
ships and annual allocations to Division II and III schools; $33,659,000 for member institu-
tion programs and services, including marketing, licensing and promotion, and rule en-
forcement; $18,268,000 for operation of the national office; $3,750,000 for governance and
committees; $17,300,000 to settle litigation involving restricted earnings for coaches;
$14,452,000 for student-athlete welfare, including youth programs, drug testing and re-
search, and the NCAA Initial-Eligibility Clearinghouse. See id.
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doubtedly fulfill his coach's wishes despite compromising his or her own
studies. 6
Additionally, the college's athletic treasury pockets millions of dollars
at the student-athlete's expense.227 It appears uncontroverted that
"[y]oung athletes should not be admitted to a college where, even with
remediation, they are likely to fail; it is a scandal and disgrace that illiter-
ate athletes have been admitted to college. 2 2 8 In far too many cases, and
in spite of the NCAA minimum eligibility rules, the college athlete fin-
ishes with "[n]o education, no degree, no skills, no money, [and] no ca-
reer."2 9 Fortunately, in addition to the weak changes that the NCAA
proposed in Cureton, numerous possibilities exist which place a much• 230
stronger emphasis on academics and amateurism. Most of these alter-
natives would require major changes, but given the many NCAA short-
comings, these opportunities could only strengthen the respect and
authority of this troubled institution.31
A. Earning Valuable Skills and the Elusive Degree
One possibility would include a complete elimination of all testing and
minimum eligibility standards and allow the schools to set their own
232standards. At many schools, the difference between the average SAT
226. See SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 9, at 100 (reporting results of a study
comparing students' educational and athletic experiences at all three NCAA divisions).
227. See GOLENBOCK, supra note 38, at 5.
228. Clark, supra, note 161, at 274.
229. GOLENBACK, supra note 38, at 5.
230. See infra notes 265-280 and accompanying text (discussing different possibilities).
231. See generally Andrew Zimbalist, College Sports Crisis: Is It Time for a Serious
Overhaul?, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1999, at A19. The NCAA may finally realize that it
must change its business style. See id. Recently, the NCAA hired a law firm to review its
bylaws and to determine if antitrust problems may arise and established a commission to
suggest changes within the current basketball system to "make it more congruent with the
Association's proclaimed academic mission." Id. The commission considered freshman
ineligibility as a possible solution, but did not recommend it. See id. The commission pro-
posed, for the first time, to provide students who do not meet the minimum SAT or GPA
standards with the opportunity to receive a full athletic scholarship. See id. The commis-
sion also recommended linking graduation rates over a school's previous four years to the
amount of scholarships a school can receive. See id.
232. See SHROPSHIRE, IN BLACK AND WHITE, supra note 24, at 120-21 (describing
examples of schools that dropped standardized testing requirements and saw no negative
impact on the university or the student). Head basketball coach John Calipari of the Uni-
versity of Massachusetts suggests that schools admit athletes who have scored no less than
250 points below the school's median SAT score. See JOHN CALIPARI, REFUSE TO LOSE
184 (1996). A school with an average SAT score of 1000 can admit a student with an SAT
no lower than 750. See id. at 184-85. Although Calipari believes that university presidents
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score and an athlete's SAT score exceeds 300 points."' Why should a
student with an 820 SAT score, despite passing Proposition 16 require-
ments, usurp another student's chance to enter a top university when the
other student's hard work has earned him a 1360 SAT score and a 3.5
GPA?14 The answer is because college programs need to be athletically
competitive and have accomplished this by using the "special admit"
loophole in the admissions department."' Most schools frequently use
"special admits" and admit a small percentage of applicants whose quali-
fications fall below the norm, but possess other exemplary skills that the
216university values. Athletic departments often negotiate with admis-
sions departments, allowing them to gain admittance of many athletes
whose standards are far below the school minimum.237 Schools and
coaches concoct borderline, yet legal ploys to persuade prospective re-
cruits to attend their university, which the NCAA cannot sanction.238
will never adopt this policy, he proposes that such a policy would allow prospective stu-
dent-athletes to survive in an environment suited for their academic capabilities. See id. at
185.
233. See Denlinger, supra note 221, at D7.
234. See DEALY, supra note 28, at 123. In a letter to the editors of Sports Illustrated,
Collie F. James III of Piano, Texas said:
"My son-1360 on the SAT's, 3.5 grade point average, National Merit scholar-
ship semifinalist, starting quarterback on the football team, starting pitcher on
the baseball team-is one of 12,000 students who have applied for a spot in next
fall's freshman class at Georgetown. Some 10,000 of those applicants, most of
whom have impressive credentials, will be turned down. It is ludicrous to believe
that a student with a 2.0 GPA and a 700 total score on the SAT's should be al-
lowed to occupy a seat in the classroom when so many young people who have
put great effort into their studies are told to go elsewhere."
Id.
235. SPERBER, supra note 3, at 219. Some experts estimate that colleges enroll 80%-
90% of men's basketball and football players based on "special admits." Zimbalist, supra
note 231, at A19. Despite this loophole, lowering admission standards in order to admit
talented athletes began well before "the advent of athletic scholarships." SACK &
STAUROWSKY, supra note 9, at 96.
236. SPERBER, supra note 3, at 219.
237. See id.; CALIPARI, supra note 232, at 183. Calipari candidly describes his interac-
tion with the admissions' staff as he used to confer with the admissions officers and review
each recruit on a case-by-case basis. See id. The coach appears proud of the fact that he
only admitted four players who did not meet the minimal academic standards during his
eight years. See id.
238. See, e.g., WOLFF & KETEYIAN, supra note 180, at 133. One example of a legal
but very suspect practice is when coaches hire a potential recruit's high school coach in a
"package deal." Id. at 133, 134. The University of Kansas unsuccessfully recruited high
school star Danny Manning, who seemed destined for the University of North Carolina,
until Kansas's coach Larry Brown hired Danny's father Ed (a truck driver) as an assistant
coach. See id. at 134. The family moved to Lawrence, Kansas and Danny eventually led
Kansas to the 1988 National Championship. See id.
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Challenging universities to raise their standards through self-regulation is
an option, but the pressure that coaches, boosters, and universities face
does not make this seem feasible.239
One expert suggested testing, not upon entering college, but at the
conclusion of a four-year education by using the Graduate Record Ex-
amination (GRE).240 Experts say the GRE is less culturally biased than
the SAT and provides a more balanced gauge because it tests general
concepts which should be familiar to everyone completing course re-
241ntfistacivthquirements at a four-year institution. If a student fails to achieve the
minimum GRE cutoff score, the school could lose an athletic scholarship
from its designated total instead of individually penalizing the student
being penalized under Proposition 16.242 If a player left school during the
term of his four-year scholarship, the school would be penalized by not
being allowed to fill that student's scholarship until the player's entire
four-year eligibility period runs out.243 This may revive the student com-
ponent of the student-athlete by forcing students to study and requiring
coaches to consider the player's, as well as their own, best interests. Un-
fortunately, this plan will cause coaches to shy away from players with
weak academic records for fear that they will never be able to compete
academically in college, thus never providing a chance to someone who
may be able to succeed. On the other hand, others argue that students
who are unable to compete academically in that school's environment
should not be there in the first place.244
Another possible solution allows student-athletes unable to obtain the
minimum SAT scores access to postgraduate preparatory schools. 245 This
239. See HART-NABBRIG & COTrINGHAM, supra note 3, at 112 ("One thing is certain:
athletic directors, coaches, and boosters will not sit still and watch a group of CEO's try to
legitimize academic standards by ruining the athletic goose laying golden eggs.").
240. See SPERBER, supra note 3, at 226.
241. See id. at 226-227 (stating that students without knowledge of most of the skills
tested in the GRE probably would not be able to pass most regular university classes dur-
ing a four-year period).
242. See id. at 227.
243. See id.
244. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 161, at 274 & n.41.
245. See Taylor, supra note 181, at 149. The postgraduate school should not be con-
fused with junior colleges. See generally Alexander Wolff, The Juco Express, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 18, 1987, at 6. Since Proposition 16's strict standards do not apply to
junior colleges, a junior college student may play right away. See id. at 13. After two years
in junior college, a student-athlete still has two years of eligibility, but only needs to meet
minimal NCAA standards and the school's admission standards to maintain eligibility.
See Andrew Bagnato, The Buck Stops Nowhere: Eligibility Rules Abrogated as NCAA,
Junior Colleges Feud, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 6,1995, at C1. Coaches quickly realized that jun-
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option provides students the chance to play basketball and take classes
designed to increase their SAT scores.246 The greatest attribute that prep
schools offer to recruiters and students, unlike junior college or Proposi-
tion 16, is that the students do not lose a year of eligibility. 4 1 Prep
schools also help troubled students develop study habits and skills that
will help them in college and beyond. 8
Perhaps the most sensible and most radical alternative possibility re-
249verts back to 1972 and eliminates freshman eligibility altogether. Until
1972, freshman athletes had almost "20 seasons without the right to play
on the varsity" squad.20 This ban allowed the student-athlete to be a
student "first and foremost., 25' The university can guide the over-
whelmed freshman student-athlete and simultaneously make a statement
that academics come first.2 12 It is undisputed that all freshman, whether
or not they play sports, must make tremendous adjustments to living
away from home in a new social setting while entering into a more rigor-. 253
ous academic environment. A freshman athlete who is only permitted
to practice during his first year, or one who wants to play professionally
254after one or two seasons, may lose his patience. The elimination of
freshman eligibility may replace these students with student-athletes who
value academics and athletics equally.25 Another option suggests that
ior colleges could store prospects, allow them to mature for two years, and then allow
them to contribute immediately. See id. This trend continued until three NCAA schools
committed academic fraud concerning the recruitment of junior college athletes. See id.
246. See Taylor, supra note 181, at 150. In recent years, former Florida State Univer-
sity guard and current National Basketball Player (NBA) player Sam Cassell, and former
Syracuse University guard and top freshman in the Big East conference Lawrence Moten
took advantage of postgraduate schools and succeeded in college. See id.
247. See id. at 149-50. A well-known prep school success includes Johnny Rhodes,
who spent one year at Maine Central Institute to raise his SAT score, and then attended
the University of Maryland for four productive seasons. See id.
248. See id. at 151.
249. See Wolff & Smith, supra note 223, at 52.
250. Alan Schmadtke, A Kid's Game, THE SPORTING NEWS, Nov. 30, 1992, at S-7.
251. SHROPSHIRE, IN BLACK AND WHITE, supra note 24, at 119. Shropshire believes
that the Ivy League took a big step backward when it reinstated freshman eligibility during
the 1990s. See id. at 119-20.
252. See generally id. at 119. Many question how a freshman can come to the univer-
sity, "get his or her intellectual and social bearings, develop good study habits and devote
30 to 60 hours a week to a sport." Zimbalist, supra note 231, at A19.
253. See Wolff & Smith, supra note 223, at 52.
254. See id. Cedric Dempsey, the NCAA's executive director, stated that "[a] lot of
kids are coming to school now just to get exposure for a year or two, with no interest in
moving through the academic program. That's a real concern for me, and that's where I
think freshman ineligibility would be helpful." Zimbalist, supra note 231, at A19.
255. See Wolff & Smith, supra note 223, at 52.
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schools award freshman financial aid and only allow them to practice,
which will preserve their four years of eligibility.
B. Erosion of the Dividing Line Between College and Professional
Athletics
One perplexing problem lies in the fact that, unlike baseball, basket-
ball and football do not have minor league systems. Moreover, the re-
cent trend in basketball shows star players staying for one or two years of
college instead of the entire four years.2 ' The best college basketball
athletes have few incentives to earn a degree because such athletes se-
cure lofty professional contracts. 9  On the other hand, colleges have lit-
tle reason to offer valuable scholarship spots if Proposition 16 may dis-
qualify the recipients and if the athletes will stay for only one or two
years.260 The issue is whether there exists an alternative which allows the
NCAA to protect academics, student-athletes, and athletics simultane-
ously.
The NBA is considering a developmental league for college-age bas-
ketball players that some feel will cause even more players to leave col-
lege early or forgo college altogether.26' The NBA appears concerned
with the fact that those who do not complete college are unprepared for
the professional world "on and off the court. ' '162 The NBA is trying to
avoid a league "dominated by millionaire man-children with poor fun-
256. See Schmadtke, supra note 250, at S-7. This idea differs none from the concept of
redshirting, which is perfectly legal under the NCAA's rule and typically occurs during an
athlete's freshman year. See HART-NIBBRIG & COTTINGHAM, supra note 3, at 5. A red-
shirt student may not play organized sports during his freshman year, but has five years to
complete college, which extends his athletic career. See id. Many universities across the
country use this practice: an NBC poll found that 95% of all Division I schools redshirt
students. See id. At the University of Nebraska, 81% of all first year football players are
redshirted, which, according to the school, gives the students a better chance to graduate.
See id. Regardless of the motivation to redshirt, "this practice stabilizes the dominant po-
sition of those teams at the very top of the football and basketball hierarchy." Id.
257. See Pentimone, supra note 13, at 490 ("[T]he road to the ... National Basketball
Association is through the NCAA."). But see infra notes 267-70 and accompanying text
(describing numerous attempts to establish a minor league basketball league).
258. See Michael Bradley, The Young and Restless, THE SPORTING NEWS, Jan. 13,
1997, at 33.
259. See generally Pentimone, supra note 13, at 490. For example, Anfernee "Penny"
Hardaway, affected by Proposition 48 and number two pick in the 1993 NBA draft, signed
a $70 million contract in 1995. See Smith, supra note 2, at 1.
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damentals on the court and stunted maturity levels off it. 2 63 The Conti-
nental Basketball Association (CBA) may also reform itself to run like a
minor league basketball system. '
Perhaps the most novel idea is the eight-team Collegiate Professional
Basketball League, which hopes to start playing in Fall 2000.16' This
league will pay athletes a small salary and tuition for part-time schooling
in the city in which they play or for use within four years after mandatory
retirement (age 22).266 The new league is intriguing because it recognizes
aspiring athletes' desires to play sports, yet emphasizes the importance of
education. This concept reduces the rampant exploitation in collegiate
athletics and the hypocrisy of student-athletes in the NCAA .
Because amateurism in college athletics has almost disappeared, some
suggest taking the next step toward transforming college athletics into a
semi-professional organization. A semi-professional system presup-
263. Bradley, supra note 258, at 33; see Knight, supra note 260, at DI. The most recent
horror story involves Leon Smith, the Dallas Maverick's first-round draft pick in 1999. See
id. Smith signed a three-year, $1.5 million contract straight out of high school. See id. He
refused the Maverick's request to begin playing in a developmental league or in Europe.
See id. Soon thereafter, Smith attempted suicide and was arrested twice, all within a 24-
hour period. See id.
264. See Kevin Blackistone, CBA Will Prosper Further as NBA's Minor League, THE
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 8, 1999, at C-3. NBA teams would affiliate themselves with a
current CBA team and have the ability to call up and send down young athletes who are
unprepared for the rigors'of the NBA. See id. Supporters hope that receiving minor
league wages and the idea of being "just another guy in Grand Rapids rather than [the]
Big Man On Campus" will scare kids back into colleges. Id. "As it is now ... kids taken
in the [NBA] draft's first round are all but guaranteed roster spots and multi-year, multi-
million dollar contracts." Id.
265. See David Whitford, Selling is Still 99% Sweat, FORTUNE, Sept. 27, 1999, at 285.
Paul McMann, a former college professor from Babson College founded this league. See
id.
266. See id. The league plans to recruit high school seniors and offer them a $5,000
signing bonus, a $9,000 stipend, and money for rent, tuition, room, and board. See id. The
league requires "daily workouts" and "personal appearances" which probably only allow
time for the athletes to attend college part-time. Id. Athletes attending school full-time
qualify for a $3,000 per year bonus, and a $10,000 bonus for graduating within four years.
See id. The league intends to rely on corporate sponsors and adopt the sponsor's names as
the team names. See id. The Boston team will be Team Lycos, Chicago will have Team
Acunet (an Internet Service Provider), and Detroit will have Team Broadcast.com. See id.
Philadelphia, Washington, Cleveland and New York teams are still seeking sponsors for
about half a million dollars per year per team. See id. Nike and Adidas will supply shoes
and the PAX network will broadcast games. See id.
267. See generally id. McMann implemented this idea because of the "widespread dis-
gust with the state of big time college sports." Id.
268. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 161, at 275; see also HART-NIBBRIG & COTIINGHAM,
supra note 3, at 108 (describing college athletics as void of all elements of amateurism).
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poses a more formal split between academics and athletics. 269 This sys-
tem would compensate the athlete through a minimal salary and en-
dorsements and recruit them solely on athletic talent .7 Experts sup-
porting this proposal lament that the current system is hopelessly
ineffective for scholarship athletes, especially A27can-Amecans. Un-
fortunately, recommending ideas to strengthen the import of academics
by colleges and universities will further distance the student and the ath-
lete.272
Because student-athletes practice many hours per week and do not
have time to work, a more realistic compromise may include increased
financial aid or cash payments to provide for their living expenses.27' The
NCAA is currently considering that possibility by "adding $2,000 in cash
to athletic scholarships., 27 4 Given the sheer amount of students partici-
pating in NCAA athletics, this is not an easy issue to resolve. 275  The
NCAA is also considering a change that would allow athletes who have
earned prize money, have been selected into professional leagues, or
have played under professional contracts, to earn scholarships and return
to college.276
Proponents of semiprofessionalism or the NCAA's new proposals be-
lieve that the "classic definition of amateurism has outlived its usefulness
... [and] the association's rules contain contradictions that violate the
Despite the demise of amateurism, many feel that the public still believes and views col-
lege "games [as] unadulterated by raw commercial value." Id.
269. See HART-NIBBRIG & COTTINGHAM, supra note 3, at 108. The separation of the
sports department from the academic university would reduce the college team to a sym-
bolic link of the academic institution, but would allow recruiting based solely on athletic
talent. See id. If this proposal were ever considered legitimately, there is a strong likeli-
hood that legislatures, alumni, boosters, local businesses, students, and the public would
offer little support. See id.
270. See Clark, supra note 161, at 275; HART-NIBBRIG & COTTINGHAM, supra note 3,
at 108.
271. See Clark, supra note 161, at 276 & n.47 (pointing to the extremely low gradua-
tion rates of student-athletes, particularly African-American student-athletes, and the fact
that the majority never make it to the professional ranks).
272. See HART-NIBBRIG & COTTINGHAM, supra note 3, at 108.
273. See SPERBER, supra note 3, at 267; see also Clark, supra note 161, at 277 & n.49
(recognizing the difficulty in sustaining two full-time jobs as both a student and an ath-
lete).
274. Mark Asher, NCAA Ponders Paying Athletes, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1999, at D1.
275. See id. (stating that at Division I schools, 40,000 men and women receive full
scholarships, many more receive partial scholarships and about 335,000 men and women
participate in all levels of NCAA athletic competition).
276. See Welch Suggs, The Demise of the 'Amateur' Ideal, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC.,
Oct. 29, 1999, at A75.
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amateur ethic anyway., 277 Regardless of the direction the NCAA ulti-
mately chooses, it will only eradicate the corruption and hypocrisy cur-
rently associated with college athletics upon realization that its current
system's athletics and academics are incompatible with one another.278 If
the student-athlete only wants to be in college to play basketball or foot-
ball, then he should not be in college in the first place.279 When potential
student-athletes want to attend college but cannot because they are
forced to jump straight to the NBA or because scholarships are tied up
with students who only want to play sports and have no interest in
studying, a significant problem exists.8
IV. CONCLUSION
Although Proposition 16 and its predecessors have dramatically af-
fected college athletics, statistics show that this effect is mainly at the ex-
pense of minority and low-income students. The NCAA and the Cureton
court proposed alternatives to Proposition 16 which only tweak the ex-
isting policy rather than force full-scale change. The problem is that the
market dictates what must happen and the current market is extremely
commercial. As a result, coaches and schools selfishly sacrifice an aca-
demically exceptional student for someone who will give the program an
immediate boost athletically. Only a deep-rooted, honest desire to
change the state of affairs in college sports will succeed. Unfortunately,
almost every proposed solution to the commercialization of college
sports or eligibility standards has allowed coaches, players, and adminis-
trators to find a loophole or a way around any rule. An overall change in
the mentality of the college sports world is necessary.
As a starting point, freshman ineligibility appears to cure much of what
ails college sports today, and makes the student-athlete a student first.
Coupling an additional year of eligibility with freshman ineligibility is the
perfect compromise. This solution renders the need for minimum test
scores obsolete because a student who cannot satisfy the school's aca-
demic requirements during his freshman year provides a far better pre-
277. Id.
278. See SPERBER, supra note 3, at 348 (stating that the NCAA should stop "pretend-
ing" that college sports are "connected to their educational missions").
279. See SLAM BAM JAM, supra note 201.
280. See Knight, supra note 260, at D8 (quoting University of Delaware's basketball
coach Mike Brey); Bradley, supra note 258, at 34. According to former Toronto Raptors
General Manager lsiah Thomas, "Kevin [Garnett] would be the first to tell you that he
wanted to go to college .... Proposition 48 worked against the NCAA in that case." Id.
Garnett went straight to the NBA after graduating from high school. See id.
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dictor of success than the SAT. This proposal also allows schools to set
their own minimum standards to recruit and simultaneously eliminates
NCAA enforcement and its problematic standards. Finally, it eliminates
the reality that college athletics is a one or two year minor league pro-
gram for basketball and football players. This proposal has the potential
to change the dynamics of college sports for the better.
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